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WHEN SHOULD STATES CHALLENGE MERGERS:
A PROPOSED FEDERAL/STATE BALANCE*
ROBERT H. LANDE**

It is clear that state antitrust enforcers are able to challenge corporate
mergers. I A state is even able to challenge the largest nationwide
transactions so long as it can show that the state itself, its citizens, or its
economy is affected in a way that provides standing. Each state has the
power to initiate such challenges regardless what enforcement or
nonenforcement decisions the federal antitrust enforcers make. In recent
years the states have shown much greater willingness to exercise this
prerogative.
Critics fear negative effects from ascendent state merger scrutiny.
Many believe that the government's position towards exceptionally large
transactions should be a fundamental matter of national economic policy.2
Enforcement and nonenforcement decisions, they say, should be made by
officials appointed by the President with the approval of the U.S. Senate.3
Such critics fear that the prospect of challenge by any of fifty states adds
uncertainty and delay into an already problematic process, and will cause
beneficial transactions never to be attempted.4 Their fears are often
exacerbated by the belief that state enforcers sometimes have parochial or
politically suspect motives and may be relatively inexperienced.s Critics
watch the European Economic Community advance towards greater

* Presented at a conference entitled Observing the Shennan Act Centennial: The Past
and Future of Antitrust As Public Interest Law, sponsored by the faculty and Law Review
of New York Law School (Nov. 16, 1990).
** Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. The author thanks
Michael Brockmeyer for help developing many of the central ideas in this article. The
author also is grateful to William Blumenthal, James Egan, David Frankel, Ernest Gellhorn,
Robert Langer, and Malcolm Ffunder for extremely insightful comments and suggestions,
and to David Kimberling for research assistance. This article evolved from work the author
performed while on an ABA Antitrust Section task force that was studying the relationship
between federal and state merger enforcement The views expressed and remaining
mistakes are solely those of the author.
1. This article will use the term "merger" as a shorthand that includes related types of
corporate acquisitions, as well.
2. See, e.g., Bell, States Should Stay Out of National Mergers, 3 ANTITRUST 37,39
(1989).

3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.; see also infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
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economic unity in 1992 and fear that the United States economy is sliding
into Balkanization.
Others hotly dispute these contentions. They maintain that state merger
enforcement has been responsible, and contend that each state attorney
general has an obligation to protect his or her state and its economy and
citizens from the potential exercise of market power.6 Although Congress
wanted our nation's primary antitrust enforcement to be at the federal
level, it also intended for the states to have a role.'
This article will attempt to balance these competing concerns by
focusing upon the classes pf mergers for which the potential problems are
likely to be most significant. It will attempt to delineate categories of
mergers for which states should be the primary enforcer, and categories for
which they normally should defer to federal enforcement and
nonenforcement decisions. This balancing will occur in light of the role the
states are supposed to play in the federal system and the degree to which
the critics' fears have been justified. This article will attempt to reconcile
principles of federal supremacy and the need for national economic
decisionmaking with the states' obligations to protect themselves, their
citizens, and their economies from potentially anticompetitive mergers. It
also will attempt to accommodate merging parties' need to know, as a
practical matter, which enforcer is likely to scrutinize a particular merger
closely.
This article will propose a series of merger "Federalism Guidelines"
that the state and federal enforcers should consider for inclusion within
their respective sets of substantive merger guidelines, or within any unified
set of substantive guidelines that the federal and state enforcers might be
able to negotiate. The proposed Federalism Guidelines are printed in an
Appendix to this article.8 These Federalism Guidelines start with the
premise of general federal supremacy in merger enforcement and from this
promulgate an explicit division of responsibility. They delineate a category
of mergers for which the state enforcers should virtually always defer to
federal enforcement decisions. 9 The Federalism Guidelines also delineate
a categ070 of mergers for which the states should be the prime
enforcers, 0 leaving the remaining mergers subject to scrutiny at both

6. See, e.g., Constantine, 17re States' Role in Challenging National Mergers Is Vital,
3 ANTITRUST 37, 37-38 (1989).
7. See infra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
8. See infra at p. 1091.
9. This category encompasses the largest national mergers and is modeled after the
European Economic Community approach which provides that such mergers usually should
be handled at the Community level.
10. This category includes mergers that primarily affect only that state.
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leveIs. ll The primary purpose of the Federalism Guidelines is to inform
firms, as a practical matter, when states are most-and least-likely to
initiate a challenge.
In the recent past no solution remotely like the one being proposed
here could have been seriously considered, due to mutual federal/state
distrust But there now exists the solid basis for an era of mutual
state/federal tolerance and respect The current federal enforcers are'
reasonable pragmatists whose enforcement decisions are likely to be given
great deference by the state enforcers. This is the perfect time to
memorialize and solidify the spirit of cooperation. Federalism Guidelines
agreed to under the current climate would be likely to constitute reasonable
compromises that the federal and state enforcers would be able to accept
for many years.

I.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

A. The States' Authority to Challenge Mergers
When Congress enacted the federal antitrust laws it chose not to
foreclose state antimerger activity.12 The legislative histories of the
antitrust laws indicate that the congressional purpose was to supplement,
not supplant, state activity.13 This intention has repeatedly been affirmed
by the Supreme Court. 14

11. See infra pt m(C).
12. See, e.g., Dual StatefFederal Merger Enforcement Task Force, Legal and Policy
Implications of Concurrent Merger Enforcement Activity Under State and Federal Law
(Mar. 27, 1989) (unpublished memorandum prepared by a task force consisting of M.
Ffunder, R. Myers, R. Lande, R. Bell, M. Brockmeyer, and S. Farmer, issued to the ABA
Antitrust Section Council) (on file at New York Law School Law Review office) [hereinafter
M. Ffunder].
13. Senator Sherman intended that the Sherman Act
invoke the aid of the courts of the United States to deal with the combinations
•.. and in this way to supplement the enforcement of the established rules of the
common and statute law by the courts of the several states in dealing with
combinations that affect injuriously the industrial liberty of the citizens of these
states. It is to arm the Federal courts within the llinits of their constitutional
power that they may co-operate with the State courts in checking, curbing, and
controlling the most dangerous combinations that now threaten the business,
property, and trade of the people of the United States.
21 CONGo REc. 2457 (1890); see also Note, State Anti-Merger Policy: Divesting the Federal
Government of Exclusive Regulation, 12 LoY. U. Cln. LJ. 531, 557 n.143 (1981) (stating
that Senator Sherman's declared purpose of the Sherman Act was to supplement state law,
not to preempt it).
14. The most recent case supporting this view is California v. Anlerican Stores Co.,
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States can sue under state antimerger laws1s or under state antitrust
statutes with provisions comparable to the Sherman ACt. 16 States also can
sue under the federal antitrust laws, using three theories. 17 First, the state
may be able to sue for injunctive relief in its capacity as a purchaser of the
product(s) in question18 and, if it is a direct purchaser, for damages. 19
Second, a state can bring suit under its common law parens patriae
authority in its "quasi-sovereign" capacity or "as agent and protector of her
people against a continuing wrong done to them . . . ..,20 Under federal
common law a state has the parens patriae authority to secure injunctive
relief to protect its economy against future violations of the federal
antitrust laws.21 Third, a state can obtain injunctive relief and divestiture
under section 16 of the Cla~on Act, acting as parens patriae of the
consumers within its borders.
State merger challenges potentially can give rise to two types of
constitutional issues.23 First, Congress could preempt state antimerger

110 S. Ct. 1853 (1990) (holding that states can seek divestiture as a fonn of equitable relief
under section 16 of the Clayton Act). In California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93
(1989), the Court observed that "[i]t is plain that [antitrust] is an area traditionally regulated
by the States" and that "Congress intended the federal antitrust laws to supplement, not
displace, state antitrust remedies." Id. at 101-02.
15. A 1981 source lists 10 state antiroerger provisions. See Note, supra note 13, at 534
n.20.
16. A list of 19 such state statutes was compiled in 1981. See id. at 535 n.21. Suits
based on state laws can be brought in federal court if the states have pendent federal claims.
See M. Pfunder, supra note 12, at 11.
17. These theories are explained in more detail in M. Pfunder, supra note 12, at 12.
18. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1988) (state assumes the role of private plaintiff
entitled to injunctive relief); see also Cargill v. Montfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 122
(1986) (holding that private plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief under section 16 of the
Clayton Act if they can show a significant threat of injury).
19. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988).
20. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 443 (1945).
21. Id. at 445, 447-48; Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 261 (1972). States,
under their parens patriae authority, may obtain injunctive relief but not treble damages.
Suits seeking such relief have long been recognized and there is no reason to exclude them
from the purview of the antitrust acts. Id. at 261-64.
22. California v. American Stores Co., 110 S. Ct. 1853, 1855, 1866·67 (1990).
23. Several other constitutional issues, such as equal protection and due process, also
could arise from state merger enforcement See ABA ANTITRUST SECI10N, MONOGRAPH
No. 15, ANTITRUST FEDERAUSM: nm ROLE OF STATE LAw 16-24 (1988). In addition, a
mandatory compact among the states at the expense of the supremacy of the United States
government could violate the Constitution's compact clause. See Note, To Form a More
Perfect Union?: Federalism and Informal Interstate Cooperation, 102 HARv. L. REv. 842,
858-59 (1989).
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laws by virtue of its powers under the supremacy clause to the extent
necessary to effectuate federal goals.24 Second, the commerce clause may
prevent state merger enforcement actions that unduly discriminate against,
regulate, or burden interstate commerce.2S Although the issues are not free
from doubt,26 constitutional problems related to state merger enforcement

24. See M. Pfunder, supra note 12, at 38-41. The Supreme Court recently explained
the doctrine succinctly:
It is accepted that Congress has the authority, in exercising its Article I powers,
to pre-empt state law. In the absence of an express statement by Congress that
state law is pre-empted, there are two other bases for finding pre-emption. First,
when Congress intends that federal law occupy a given field, state law in that
field is pre-empted. Second, even if Congress has not occupied the field, state
law is nevertheless pre-empted to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law,
that is, when compliance with both state and federal law is impossible, or when
the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress."
••• When Congress legislates in a field traditionally occupied by the States,
"we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress." Given the long history of state common-law and statutory
remedies against monopolies and unfair business practices, it is plain that this is
an area traditionally regulated by the States.
California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100-01 (1989) (citations omitted).
25. See M. Pfunder, supra note 12, at 42-49. In Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v.
New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573 (1986), the Supreme Court summarized the
analysis:
'This Court has adopted what amounts to a two-tiered approach to analyzing state
economic regulation under the Commerce Clause. When a state statute directly
regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce, or when its effect is to
favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests, we have generally
struck down the statute without further inquiry. When, however, a statute has
only indirect effects on interstate commerce and regulates evenhandedly, we
have examined whether the state's interest is legitimate and whether the burden
on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits. We have also
recognized that there is no clear line separating the category of state regulation
that is virtually per se invalid under the Commerce Clause, and the category
subject to the • • • balancing approach. In either situation the critical
consideration is the overall effect of the statute on both local and interstate
activity.
1d. at 578-79 (citations omitted).
26. For example, noted constitutional authority Ernest GeIIhorn concluded:
In many cases, I believe that recent state efforts are preempted because the
federal government has preempted the field, but I recognize it is often a difficult
question. • •• Our federalist fathers wrote a Constitution which includes a
Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause that provide for different state
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appear to be minor. It seems unlikely that any state merger challenge,
under either federal law or a substantially identical state law, would be
found unconstitutional either because of federal preemption27 or the
commerce clause.28 No state merger challenge has recently been blocked
on constitutional grounds.29

B. The Federaf/State Relationship
Many observers analyze the relationship between federal and state
merger enforcement under the implicit assumption that the states have
come virtually out of nowhere and are now invading the federal enforcers'
enforcement approaches than the ones [recently carried out] •••• in reviewing
recent state innovations, I find the encroachment on federal antitrust
~nsibilities too intrusive. The states have ignored the fact that the federal
government has occupied the field of national antitrust policy.
GeIIhom, Stales' Role Is Regulation of Local Conduct, 2 ATRS REP. 6, 6 (1989).
27. According to Professor Herbert Hovenkamp, "[i]t Seems clear, today, that the
assertion that federal law occupies the field will not be sufficient to preempt state antitrust
law." Hovenkamp, State Antitrust in the Federal Scheme, 58lND. LJ. 375,403 (1983).
Professors Areeda and Turner explained:
Where state law prohibits the same, or less than the federal antitrust law, there
is, therefore, no general difficulty in giving effect to the state's commands.
However, where state law forbids more than federal law-which is not the usual
situation-the problem is more subtle. The general answer is that such a state law
remains consistent with federal law, and is not preempted. The fact that federal
law tolerates certain conduct does not necessarily mean that there is an
affirmative federal policy encouraging such conduct
1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANnTRUST LAw: AN ANALYSIS OF ANnTRUST PRINCIPLES
AND THEIR APPUCATION , 208, at 58-59 (1978).
28. See M. Pfunder, supra note 12, at 42-48 and sources cited therein; Note, supra note
13, at 555.
29. As Professor Hovenkamp observed:
[A]pplications of state antitrust laws to situations "in or affecting" interstate
commerce have rarely been condemned and nearly all cases that did condemn
such applications were decided before 1935, when judges had a much more
restrictive view of the power of the states to regulate in interstate commerce, or
to exercise their jurisdiction over persons outside the state. The Supreme Court
has upheld applications of state antitrust laws where significant interstate
commerce or extraterritorial activity is involved •..•
• • . Since the Supreme Court has held in a long line of cases that
preemption is not to be presumed or inferred, and because Congress clearly
intended that state antitrust law not be preempted as a general matter, there are
virtually no operative limits on the reach of state antitrust law under the
commerce clause.
Hovenkamp, supra note 27, at 386-90 (footnotes omitted).

1990)

FEDERAl/STATE BALANCE

1053

province.30 They analyze this "change" and evaluate whether. it is
desirable. This approach, however, is like viewing one frame of a motion
picture. The current dynamic is merely the latest stage in a complementary
relationship that goes back a century. The balance between federal and
state enforcement of the trade regulation laws has shifted throughout this
period. This history suggests that for the foreseeable future there will be
overlapping and potentially conflicting federal and state trade regulation
activity. The federal and state regulators, and the rest of the antitrust world,
should accept this shifting balance and attempt to devise the best overall
approach towards reconciling competing state and federal concerns.
To put the role of the states in perspective we should briefly return to
the start of the modem trade regulation movement. 31 An incisive article
by Professor James May observes that before the Sherman Act was passed
thirteen states had enacted antitrust statutes, fourteen state constitutions
contained antitrust provisions, and the states had prosecuted half a dozen
successful antitrust cases against major trusts. 32 During the first decade
after the Sherman Act was passed, more antitrust suits were filed by state
enforcers than by their federal counterparts.33 Not only were the state

30. See Scher, The Major Antitrust Issues in the Decade Ahead, 58 ANTITRUST L.J.
181, 185~86 (1989); sources cited infra notes 82-83.
31. This section will focus on trade regulation generally rather than on merger
enforcement, since prior to the 1950 Cellar-Kefauver Act and relevant Supreme Court
interpretations of the Shennan Act in the 1960s, federal merger enforcement was very lax.
See, e.g., Rhoades & Burke, Economic and Political Foundations 0/ Section 7 Enforcement
in the 1980's, 35 ANTITRUST BUll.. 373, 373-80 (1990).
32. May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure in the Formative Era: The Constitutionol
and Conceptual Reach o/State Antitrust Law, 1880-1918, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 495, 499, 500
(1987).
33. Id. at 500-01. During this early period of relatively vigorous state enforcement of
the antitrust laws there does not appear to have been any anti-state rhetoric from federal
enforcers. No scholars with whom I have consulted are aware of such rhetoric. During the
first decades after the passage of the Sherman Act critics were not, for example,
admonishing the states to leave the Standard Oil trust alone and wait for the federal antitrust
enforcers to prosecute. Rather, the attitude appears to have been that both the states and the
federal antitrust enforcers should, separately or together, attempt to sue the Standard Oil
trust for antitrust violations. While it is hard to prove a negative, any future historian
looking back at the late 1980s easily could find an abundance of "anti-state" rhetoric
promulgated by certain Reagan administration enforcers. See, e.g., infra notes 82-83.
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suits more numerous, several were against large national targets.34 This
early period also saw the beginning of state merger activity.3s
As federal enforcement grew, state enforcement waned. 36 A
generation ago state antitrust enforcement was virtually nonexistent,37 and
even ten years ago, it was just beginning to come back to life.38 Only in

34. One might. for example, ask which antitrust enforcement agency was responsible
for the most antitrust fines collected during the fust generation of the existence of the
Sherman Act The surprising answer is not the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust
Division, which during the fust 20 years of the Sherman Act was responsible for only a
total of $219,000 in antitrust fines. May, supra note 32, at 502. One 1909 suit by the state
of Texas against a single Standard Oil affiliate led to a fine of more than $1.6 million. Id.
During this early period, ten states and the Oklahoma Territory broUght 24 suits against
members of the Standard Oil trust and also sued the beef, sugar, and tobacco trusts. Id. at
501.
35. See People v. Chicago Gas Trust Co., 130 m. 268, 22 N.B. 798 (1889) (state
attempted to stop anticompetitive concentration in gas and electric industry); Commonwealth
v. Dyer, 243 Mass. 472, 138 N.B. 296, cert. denied, 262 U.S. 751 (1923) (trade association
attempted to acquire 85 percent of state fish markets); State v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co.,
110 Minn. 415, 126 N.W. 126, application denied, 110 Minn. 437, 126 N.W. 623 (1910)
(defendant consolidated with five other companies in making machinery and purchasing
patents); People ex reL Morse v. Nussbaum, 32 Misc. 1,66 N.Y.S. 129 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd,
55 A.D. 245, 67 N.Y.S. 492 (App. Div. 1900), afJ'd sub nom. In re Davies, 168 N.Y. 89,
61 N.B. 118 (1901) (mergers of ice companies); State v. Eastern Coal Co., 29 R.I. 254, 70
A. 1 (1908) (attempt to comer the coal market); State v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 71
S.C. 544, 51 S.B. 455 (1905) (fertilizer company purchased all but four companies in market
and court ordered divestiture); San Antonio Gas Co. v. State, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 118, 54
S.W. 289 (1899) (merger or consolidation of four Texas electric and gas corporations).
36. There is not enough information to conclude with certainty that state enforcement
diminished because federal enforcement rose. There were other factors at work that
diminished the level of state enforcement. such as World War I, and still other factors
responsible for the rise of federal enforcement. including the appointment of Thurmond
Arnold to head the Antitrust Division.
37. See, e.g., Rahl, Toward a Worthwhile State Antitrust Policy, 39 TEx. L. REv. 753,
753-54 (1961).
38. A major reason for the states' renewed energy was the state Antitrust Grant
Program, established in 1976, under which the U.S. Congress provided nearly $30 million
to the states for antitrust enforcement activity. See 60 Minutes with the Honorable Michael
F. Brockmeyer, Chief, Antitrust Division, Office of Attorney Genera~ Maryland, 59
ANTITRUST L.J. 25, 32 (1990) [hereinafter 60 Minutes with Brockmeyer]. One source
suggested ten reasons behind the recent surge in state antitrust enforcement:
(1) a wave of new "modern" state antitrust legislation; (2) federal fmancial
support; (3) beneficial changes in federal evidentiary and remedial provisions; (4)
interstate cooperation through the National Association of Attorneys General
(NAAG); (5) the self-supporting nature of state and local antitrust enforcement
coupled with a desire to fill the gap created by Reagan administration antitrust
policies; (6) the removal by the courts of doubts surrounding the constitutionality

1990]

FEDERAI/STATE BALANCE

1055

the last five years has state enforcement become so vigorous that critics
have taken the trouble to mount a serious campaign against it.39
The historical evidence appears to suggest that there is a popular
demand for a level of trade regulation that must somehow be met by the
public enforcers.40 There is little doubt that federal merger enforcement
decreased during the 1980s.41 Although reasonable observers differ as to
whether this was desirable, it is clear that many state enforcers believed
that federal enforcement became too lax.42 They perceived a vacuum and
attempted to fill it, in three ways.
First, the states began to file many more merger enforcement actions.
Although reliable statistics on state merger cases are difficult to assemble
and it often is hard to detennine, using consistent criteria, whether an
action is a "state merger case,H43 an undoubtedly incomplete search
uncovered no state me!1er actions filed during the 1930s, 1940s, or 1950s,
two during the 1960s, two during the 1970s45 and twenty-nine

of state antitrust statutes; (7) the general tendency of state law to follow federal
precedent and operate in harmony with federal antitrust law; (8) an expansion of
state antitrust jurisdiction; (9) state legislative repudiations of the Illinois Brick
ban against indirect purchaser actions for damages; and (10) powerful state
antitrust remedies.
1 R. FOLSOM, STATE ANTITRUST LAW AND PRACTICE xxvii (1988).
39. See infra notes 82-84. It is ironic that the "anti-state" rhetoric may have helped
actuate state merger enforcement.
40. This level varies over time. It might be lower during a war than during boom times
since antitrust is in certain respects perceived of as a luxury item.
41. "There is no question [that the Reagan administration Merger Guidelines] are
somewhat more permissive." Mayer, Administration Eases Merger Guidelines, Washington
Post, June 15, 1982, at D7, col. 1 (quoting Assistant Attorney General William F. Baxter,
the chief architect of the new policies). For an excellent article containing citations and
documentation of the decrease in federal enforcement in the 1980s, see Ktattenmaker &
Pitofsky, Antitrust Merger Policy and the Reagan Administration, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 211
(1988).
42. See NAAG Adopts Enforcement Guidelinesfor State Review ofHorizontal Mergers,
52 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1306, at 476 (Mar. 12, 1987).
43. Methodological issues could arise over my decision to count cases where private
or federal participation prior or subsequent to the state suit also occurred, cases settled
without a fonnal complaint being filed, and unreported cases. Reasonable people also could
disagree over my decision to count cases involving more than one state as only one case,
to count cases involving two mergers in the same industry at roughly the same time as one
case, and that certain joint ventures and monopolization schemes were in effect mergers.
Mergers abandoned after a state decision to challenge but without an agreement in writing
between the state and the parties were not counted.
44. The two 19608 actions were Michigan ex. reL Slay v. Michigan Savings Bank,
1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) , 71,741 (Sup. a. Mich. AprilS, 1966) (unsuccessful challenge to
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cases46 and sixteen amicus briefs or comments filed47 during the 1980s.

acquisition of two local banks), and Peoples Savings Bank v. Stoddard, 359 Mich. 297, 102
N.W.2d 777 (1960) (successful divestiture of savings bank).
45. The two actions filed in the 19708 were California v. Timberlanes of Redding, Inc.,
1979-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) , 62,987 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1979) (consent decree barring merger
of two bowling alleys), and Minnesota v. Koch Refining Co., No. 4-78, Civ. 135 (D. Minn.
1979) (attempt to enjoin merger of petroleum distributors).
46. State merger cases filed during the 19808:
1989
1. Pennsylvania moved to block Eastern Airlines' sale of its gates to USAir by
filing a petition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in New York. The sale was ultimately
canceled. See In re Eastern Airlines, Inc., No. 89-B-I0449 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989);
NAAG Antitrust & Commerce Rep. 8 (Summer 1989).
2. A consent decree was entered by West Virginia to preclude Hickman
Corporation from acquiring the Wolman division of Koppers Company, Inc. Both
manufactured a chemical used for the preservation of wood and wood products. See
NAAG Antitrust & Commerce Rep. 6 (Mar./Apr. 1989).
3. New York and 13 other states filed suit against Mastercard and Visa for their
merger or joint venture involving the "Entree" card. A settlement agreement was
reached in 1990. See New York v. Visa, U.S.A., Inc., No. 89-Civ. 5043 (S.D.N.Y.
1989); 58 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1465, at 709 (May 10, 1990);
NAAG Antitrust & Commerce Rep. 14 (Apr./May 1990).
4. Washington brought a sult regarding the merger of st. Joseph Hospital and
St. Luke's Hospital. A Memorandum of Understanding (essentially a settlement),
effective April 18, 1989, was entered into.
5. Minnesota challenged acquisitions in the rubbish handling business. Letter
of Assurance placed restrictions on future acquisitions. See In re Browning-Ferris
Indust. (Olmstead Co. Dist. Ct. 1989); Letter from Thomas F. Pursell, Assistant
Attorney General, Antitrust Division, State of Minnesota to Robert Lande (June 26,
1991) [hereinafter Pursell Letter] (on file at New York Law School Law Review
office).
6. A challenge to a series of acquisitions in the ready mix business. Divestiture
and other relief were agreed to in an Assurance of Discontinuance. See In re
Southern Minnesota Ready Mix, Inc, No. CX89-10963 (Ramsey Co. Dist. Ct. Oct.
4, 1989).
1988
1. Massachusetts. Maine, and New Hampshire brought a suit attempting to
block the merger of department stores in the Boston area. A consent decree was
entered. See Massachusetts v. Campeau Corp., 1988-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)' 68,093
(D. Mass. 1988); NAAG Antitrust & Commerce Rep. 9 (Apr. 1988).
2. California filed suit to block the merger of grocery stores. See California v.
American Stores Co., 110 S. Ct. 1853 (1990).
3. Texas attempted to block a merger between Gearhart Industries and
Halliburton, two companies in the wireline service industry. A temporary restraining
order was granted but then dissolved based on an agreement that the policies and
practices of Gearhart would continue. See Texas v. Gearhart Indust., Inc., 1988-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) " 68,308, 68,309 (D. Tex. 1988); NAAG Antitrust & Commerce
Rep. 6 (Oct. 1988).
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4. A consent decree was entered to prevent the acquisition of competing
purchasers of raw herring in the fishing industry. See State v. Connors Bros., Ltd.,
1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) , 68,237 (Me. Super. Ct. 1988); NAAG Antitrust &
Commerce Rep. 5 (Oct 1988).
5. New York brought monopolization charges against A&P after an
investigation of its acquisition of Waldbaum, Inc. and Shopwell, Inc. A&P agreed
to divest three of its stores. See NAAG Antitrust & Commerce Rep. 10 (Jan.jFeb.
1989); 55 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1396, at 1073-74 (Dec. 22,
1988).
6. A written agreement was entered into by North and South Carolina and West
Point Pepperell, Inc. to lessen the impact of the company's merger with J.P. Stevens
& Co., Inc. The two were competitors in the manufacture and sale of sheets and
towels. New York urged the Federal Trade Commission to reject the settlement and
bring suit See NAAG Antitrust & Commerce Rep. 3 (Nov./Dec. 1988); 55 Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1387, at 669 (Oct 20,1988); 55 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1377, at 178 (Aug. 4,1988).
7. Minnesota challenged the acquisition of a competing billboard company. A
consent decree was entered. See State v. Naegele Outdoor Advertising, Inc., No. C288-7139 (Ramsey Co. Dist Ct. 1988).
8. New York entered an agreement with R.H. Macy & Co. in which the retailer
obligated itself, in the event it completed the acquisition of Federated Department
Stores, to sell certain stores. See 54 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1358,
at 502 (Mar. 24, 1988).
1. New York negotiated continuing service to eight upstate New York cities in
connection with the US Air-Piedmont merger. See Merging Airline Would Maintain
Service, Competitive Fares in New York State, 52 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 1318, at 1066 (June 4, 1987) [hereinafter Merging Airline].
1. A city, county, and the state of Pennsylvania attempted to block a
department store merger. A settlement involving divestiture was reached. See City
of Pittsburgh v. May Dep't Stores Co., 1986-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)' 67,304 (W.D.
Pa. 1986); NAAG Antitrust & Commerce Rep. 13 (Oct 1986).
,
2. Maine filed a complaint concerning the Bar Harbor and Valley Airlines
merger. A consent decree was entered. See Maine v. Bar Harbor Airways Inc., No.
86-179 (Kennebec Co. Super. Ct. filed June 9, 1987).
3. North Dakota agreed not to oppose the merger of Northwest Airlines and
Republic Airlines in return for certain specified routing and other commitments. See
NAAG Antitrust & Commerce Rep. 19 (Apr.fMay 1990); 57 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) No. 1427, at 157 (Aug. 3, 1989).
1. Texas attempted to prevent a merger between local Coca-Cola and Dr.
Pepper bottling companies. A settlement agreement was reached. See State v. CocaCola Bottling Co., 697 S.W. 2d 677 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985), appeal dismissed, 478
U.S. 1029 (1985); NAAG Antitrust & Commerce Rep. 15 (July 1986); NAAG
Antitrust & Commerce Rep. 7 (Sept 1985).
2. Maine brought suit regarding an acquisition by Waste Management, Inc. A
voluntary dismissal was filed based on written assurances. See 59 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1492, at 784 (Nov. 22, 1990).
1. California attempted to block the merger between Texaco and Getty Oil. See
State ex reL Van de Camp v. Texaco, Inc., 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) , 66,253 (Cal.
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Super. Ct. 1984), ajJ'd, 46 Cal. 3d 1147, 762 P.2d 385, 252 Cal. Rptr. 221 (1988);
NAAG Antitrust & Commerce Rep. 3 (Nov./Dee. 1988).
2. New York sought the divestiture and dissolution of a local concrete
monopoly achieved through merger. A consent decree was entered. See New York
v. Transit Mix Concrete Corp., No. 84 Civ. 4194 (S.D.N.Y. filed June 13, 1984); 46
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1171, at 1239 (June 28, 1984).
3. A consent order was issued conditioning the approval of dairy merger. See
Maine v. Grant's Dairy, No. CV 84-412 (Me. Super. Ct. 1984).
4. Pennsylvania and Rhode Island attempted to intervene in an antitrust
challenge to the Texaco/Getty merger. See Fairlawn Oil Service, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc.,
1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)' 65,899 (D.R.I. 1984).
5. Texas attempted to prevent a merger of salt water disposal firms. The case
was settled. See Texas v. Herd Corp., Civ. No. 363,287 (Tex. Dist. Ct. filed June 11,
1984); 46 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1170, at 1192 (June 21, 1984).
1983
1. A consent decree was entered barring the merger of grocery stores. See State
v. Hannaford Bros. Co., Civ. No. CV-83-151 (Me. Super. Ct. July 11, 1983).
1982
1. North Carolina instituted an action to prevent the Psychiatric Institute of
America from purchasing a psychiatric hospital from Duke University. The state lost
a summary judgment motion at the trial level, and lost on appeal, but then won on
rehearing en banco See North Carolina V. P.I.A. Asheville, Inc., 722 F.2d 59 (4th Cir.
1983), rev'd en bane, 740 F.2d 274 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1003
(1985).
.
1981
1. Tennessee attempted to block the merger of United Technologies and Carrier
Corp. A consent decree was entered. See State ex reL Leech V. United Technologies
Corp., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) , 64,075 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1981).
1980
1. Ohio challenged taxi cab operators who had acquired direct competitors. See
Ohio V. United Transportation, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 1278 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
47. State merger comments and amicus curiae briefs filed during the 19805 (not
including mere investigations):
1989
1. Texas filed comments with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
regarding the disposition of the assets of Deposit Insurance Bridge Bank, Texas
American Bancshares, Inc., and National Bancshare Corp. See Letter from Allene
Evans, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, State of Texas, to Robert
Lande (July 10, 1991) [hereinafter Evans Letter] (on file at New York Law School
Law Review office).
1988
1. Minnesota and 22 other states requested that the Department of Justice
examine the proposed merger of computer reservation systems owned by American
Airlines and Delta Airlines. See NAAG Antitrust & Commerce Rep. 11 (Mar./Apr.
1989).
1987
1. Texas filed comments with the Interstate Commerce Commission concerning
the acquisition of TraiIways by Gil Acquisition Company. The merger was
ultimately completed with the approval of the Commission. See 56 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1416, at 740 (May 18, 1989); Evans Letter, supra.
2. New York, West Virginia, and Massachusetts filed papers urging the U.S.
Department of Transportation to undertake full review of the USAir-Piedmont
merger. See NAAG Antitrust & Commerce Rep. 5 (May 1987); Merging Airline,
supra note 46, at 1~7.
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During 1988, the states appear to have filed two more merger cases than

1. New York and Massachusetts filed comments with the Department of
Transportation regarding the Texas Air-Eastern merger. The Department of
Transportation partially agreed with their assessment of the markets and effects, and
denied the merger accordingly. See NAAG Antitrust & Commerce Rep. 12 (Aug.
1986); NAAG Antitrust & Commerce Rep. 13 (June 1986).
1985
1. Texas filed comments with the Department of Transportation regarding the
merger of Muse Air CorP. and Southwest Airlines Co. The merger was ultimately
completed. See 48 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1216, at 879 (May 23,
1985); Evans Letter, supra.
2. Pennsylvania opposed the Conrail and Norfolk Southern merger by
comments to the Department of Transportation and to Congress. The merger was
ultimately disapproved by Congress. See 50 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
1269, at 1040 (June 12, 1986); NAAG Antitrust & Commerce Rep. 7 (Sept. 1985).
3. Texas filed comments with the Interstate Commerce Commission regarding
the merger of the Santa Fe and Southern Pacific Railroads. See 51 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1286, at 560 (Oct. 16, 1986); Evans Letter, supra.
1984
1. California, along with a number of other states, filed comments with the
Federal Trade Commission regarding the Texaco-Getty merger. See 47 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1176, at 227 (Aug. 2,1984).
2. California filed comments with the Interstate Commerce Commission
expressing concern over the proposed merger between the Santa Fe and Southern
Pacific Railroads. See NAAG Antitrust & Commerce Rep. 10 (July 1984).
3. Dlinois filed comments opposing the merger of Waste Management, Inc. and
SCA Services, Inc. See NAAG Antitrust & Commerce Rep. 10 (Jan. 1985).
4. Pennsylvania filed comments with the Federal Trade Commission regarding
the Chevron-Gulf merger and negotiated with Chevron to lessen impact of the '
merger. See 48 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1201, at 284 (Feb. 7, 1985);
47 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1188, at 808 (Nov. I, 1984).
1983
1. Iowa intervened in bankruptcy court proceedings to oppose the merger of
Concrete Pipe Manufacturing and Black Clawson. The bankruptcy court disapproved
the merger. See In re Concrete Pipe Mach. Co., 28 Bankr. 837 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa
1983); 44 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1121, at 1261 (June 30, 1983).
2. Michigan challenged the proposed sale of a company going through
bankruptcy. The acquisition plans were abandoned. See In re Wickes Cos., No. LA82-06657WL through LA-82-0665WL (Bankr. C.D. Cal. filed June 16, 1983).
3. Minnesota appeared in a bankruptcy proceeding to oppose U.S. Playing
Cards' bid for the purchase of Saxon Industries' Brown & Bigelow division. The bid
was withdrawn. See Pursell Letter, supra note 46.
1. An amicus curiae brief was filed by Connecticut in Remington Products, Inc.
1982
v. North American Philips Corp., 717 F. Supp. 36 (D. Conn.), rev'd, 717 F. Supp.
48 (D. Conn. 1989); 43 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1081, at 459 (Sept.
16,1982).
1981 None.
1980 None.
I am grateful to David Kimberling for helping to assemble these lists of state merger
activities.
1986
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the Department of lustice.48
Second, in 1987 the states promulgated their own substantive merger
guidelines.49 This was an effort to bring uniformity to the states'
enforcement approaches and to carry out the congressional intent
underlying the Clayton Act and relevant Supreme Court precedent more
faithfully than the federal merger guidelines.so
Third, in 1988 the states issued their Voluntary PreMerger Disclosure
CompactSl This state counterpart to the federal Hart-Scott-Rodino
premerger notification program allows merging parties to file one set of
documents with the states and be assured that the states will not serve them
with multiple civil investigatory demands.s2
Largely as a result of this state activism, the federal and state enforcers
have formed a working group that is attempting to harmonize enforcement
by, among other things, agreeing upon a single set of substantive merger
guidelines.s3 This group also is striving to avoid duplication, is devising
mechanisms to minimize the reporting burdens caused by two levels of
scrutiny, and is attempting to establish a method to allocate specific
mergers to the most appropriate enforcer.54 Both the federal and state
enforcers thus recognize the potential problems from their overlapping
authority and are earnestly cooperating to prevent any difficulty this may
cause.ss

48. For the eight state filings, see supra note 46. For the six 1988 Department of
Justice filings, see Antitrust Division's Workload Statistics During 1980s, 58 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1449, at 109, 111 (Jan. 18, 1990) [hereinafter Workload
Statistics].

49. See Horizontal Merger GuideUnes of the National Association of Attorneys
General, 52 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1306, at S-l (Mar. 12, 1987)
[hereinafter NAAG Merger Guidelines].
50. For example, the Department of Justice merger guidelines do not specify whether
they take the wealth-transfer effects of market power into account The NAAG guidelines
carefully follow congressional intent by incorporating these effects. See Barnes, Federal and
State Philosophies in the Antitrust Law of Mergers, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 263, 278-81
(1988). The NAAG and DOl guidelines use virtually the same structural parameters and
have many other features in common. The main difference is their tone: fd. at 263·64.
51. See NMG Voluntary Pre-Merger Disclosure Compact, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
, 13,410 (Aug. 16, 1988).
52. See 60 Minutes with Brockmeyer, supra note 38, at 42.
53. See Federal-State Cooperation Continues to be Major Theme at NMG Conference,
59 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1475, at 84 (July 19, 1990).
54. fd.
55. See iti.
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PouCY ISSUES ARIsING FROM OVERLAPPING
FEDERAL/STATE AUTHORITY

A. Potential Problems
Although the statest ability to challenge mergers is cleart many assert
that they should not have this power. Some believe that the states should
not have the ability to challenge any interstate mergers whatsoevert56
while others stress particular categories of mergers for which they believe
state enforcement is particularly inappropriate. The ABA Antitrust Section
recently noted that "[ilt is probably fair to conclude that a strong majority
of the antitrust bar and academic community favors exclusive federal
merger enforcement €?xcept for purely local intrastate mergers. »57
Many contend that national policy towards large nationwide mergers
is a crucial part of our nationts economic policYt so only the federal
enforcers58 should be able to challenge these mergers.59 They find it
highly inappropriate. that any of the fifty state attorneys general can
challenge and possibly block a multi-billion dollar nationwide transaction
even if the Federal Trade Commissio~ the Antitrust Division of the U.S.
Department of Justice, and the forty-nine other state attorneys general
desire for it to proceedt60 especially where the relief largely will occur in

56. For example, Timothy J. Muris, adviser to the presidential campaign of then VicePresident George Bush, was interviewed in 1988. "Asked about merger enforcement, Muris
found no need for a state attorney general to analyze mergers unless the transaction 'has no
significance beyond the one state.' If the merger is being examined at the federal level,
Muris noted, then states do not 'add anything' to the investigation." Advisers to
Presidential Candidates Differ on Most Aspects of Enforcement, 55 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) No. 1382, at 448 (Sept 15, 1988); see also infra notes 82-84.
57. Comments of the ABA Section of Antitrust Law with Respect to the Amended
Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) on the Control of Concentrations Between
Undertakings, 59 ANTITRUST LJ. 245, 255 (1990) [hereinafter ABA Comments]; see also
60 Minutes with the Honorable Janet D. Steiger, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, 59
ANTITRUST LJ. 14, 15 (1990) [hereinafter 60 Minutes with Steiger] (discussing the role of
states in enforcing antitrust policy).
58. See 60 Minutes with Steiger, supra note 57, at 15-16. While private plaintiffs also
can challenge major nationwide mergers they cannot do so as law enforcers. Their motives
may be suspect since they cannot as readily claim to be representing the public, and their
arguments sometimes lack the a;dibility of the state enforcers.
59. See Mattox v. Fre, 752 F.2d 116 (5th Cit. 1985), where the court speculated that
"[bJecause HSR [the Hart-Scott-Rodino premerger notification act] only covers transactions
likely to affect the entire national economy, Congress may have wanted to centralize
regulation of such mergers in the Pre and the Justice Department Disclosure to state
attorneys general would tend to balkanize that needed centrality." [d. at 122.
60. A state attorney general need only prove that the merger may substantiaIIy lessen
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other states. The only check on the power of a state attorney general to
challenge a nationwide transaction-the requirement that the merger
detrimentally affect the economx or citizens of that state, or the state
itself-is viewed as overly weak. 1
Principles of federalism suggest that the states were not meant to have
so much ability to influence national affairs. States entered the union
knowing they would occasionally have to sacrifice their own economic
interests for the greater good of the nation.62 The Constitution did give
the states a way to attempt to ensure that their interests were not unduly
trampled for the sake of the federal union: their elected representatives in
the United States Congress were supposed to vote and influence legislation
on their behalf. Allowing states to go further and interfere in fundamentally
national decisions runs counter to basic principles of federalism.
Further, it is confounding enough for antitrust counselors to have to
contend with two potential federal enforcement agencies. Since both the
Assistant U.S. Attorney General and the Chair of the FTC are selected by
the President,63 however, their approaches are in practice similar, if not
identical. 64 Experienced merger counselors can provide relatively certain
advice to their clients as to what the federal enforcers are likely to do by
closely monitoring both agencies. 65
It is immensely more difficult to actively monitor the enforcement
philosophies of fifty state attorneys general, many of whom have little

competition "in any section of the country." See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
61. See sources cited supra notes 57-58 and infra notes 82-83.
62. See Note, supra note 13, at 544-46; see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322,
325 (1979) ("[a] central concern of the framers [was that] ... the new union would have
to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among
.•• the States under the Articles,,). Professor John Flynn observed that "[p]erhaps the most
important lesson taught by the failure of the Articles was the realization that the American
Colonies could not hope to prosper unless a common market was established, subject to
control by one voice of government rather than thirteen." J. FLYNN, FEDERALISM AND STATE
AmrrRUST REGULATION 2 (1964).

63. Both are, of course, selected with the advice and consent of the Senate. The
President has the power to select the FTC Chainnan only from then-existing Commissioners.
If the President isn't especially enamored with any of the Commissioners (this might not
be too unusual if they all were selected by the previous administration) he can designate the
least objectionable as Acting Chainnan and wait for a vacancy to arise.
64. FTC officials have been reluctant to allow their policies to diverge too much from
those of the Antitrust Division, perhaps partly out of fear that different policies could lead
to business confusion that might prompt Congress to end dual jurisdiction at the federal
level by stripping the FTC of its antitrust authority.
65. Merger counselors observe which mergers the federal enforcers choose to challenge
and monitor their speeches and articles. Counselors can meet with the federal enforcers on
repeated transactions and thereby learn a good deal about their enforcement approaches.
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track record in the merger area (and some of whom bring few antitrust
cases of any type).66 The state attorneys general come from both political
parties and can have widely differing enforcement philosophies.67 The
states have agreed upon a common substantive standard to be used in
evaluating mergers-the NAAG Merger Guidelines.68 No set of guidelines
with fifty different potential enforcers can offer anything close to
predictability, however, since enforcers with divergent philosophies
necessarill will interpret ambiguous terms differently in various factual
contexts. In the extreme, business would be forced "to limit its activities
to the levels set by the most restrictive state interpretation of federal
antitrust law.,,70 The additional uncertainty from fifty potential state
reviews, along with the inevitable accompanying delays and costs,71 could
cause many beneficial transactions never to be attempted. These
uncertainties and costs are an increment to the transaction costs already
arising from federal review, which by itself may deter significant beneficial
transactions.72
The prospect of simultaneous investigations or suits by both federal
and state enforcers gives rise to more than just costs, delays and
uncertainty. As the number of parties increase, settlements may become
exponentially more difficult to reach. Confidentiality problems also
multiply as the number of investigations rise.
66. See generally W. HAYNES, STATE ANTITRUST LAWS (1989) (general discussion of
state antitrust enforcement).
67. For example, one state attorney general, Hal Stratton of New Mexico, objected to
the issuance of the NAAG Merger Guidelines after they were issued. See New Mexico
Attorney General Stratton Repudiates NAAG's Horizontal Guidelines, 52 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1314, at 869 (May 7, 1987); Stratton, Attorneys General in State of
Collusion, Wall St J., June 10, 1988, at A3, col. 4.
68. See NAAG Merger Guidelines, supra note 49.
69. Moreover, the NAAG Merger Guidelines explicitly provide that "[i]ndividual
Attorneys General may vary or supplement this general policy in recognition of variations
in precedents among the federal circuits and differences in state antitrust laws and in the
exercise of their individual prosecutorial discretion." ld. at S-3.
70. Gellliorn, supra note 26, at 21.
71. See Lieberman v. FTC, 771 F.2d 32 (2d. Cir. 1985), where the court noted that
giving state authorities the premerger information and the chance to bring suit
more easily might well mean big delays in the fast world of mergers •.•• We
doubt if Congress would have intended to have the staffs of fifty state attorneys
general sitting as oversight committees reacting to Commission or Justice
Department decisions whether to block large-scale mergers of national or
international significance.
ld. at 40.
72. Experienced practitioners have told the author that this happened to their clients on
several occasions.
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Furthermore, many state enforcers lack resources,73 experience, and
expertise.74 Only twenty-one states apparently filed one or more merger
actions since 1980.75 To my knowledge, New York, the state most active
in mer~er enforcement, brought only eight enforcement actions during the
1980s. 6 No merger enforcer can learn to evaluate mergers properly from
just a theoretical perspective.77 Federal antitrust enforcers have significant
practical experience since they seriously scrutinize dozens of mergers each
year.78 Nonetheless, even they could never claim to be error free. A state
assistant attorney general, who might in his or her career have seriously
examined the competitive effects of only a handful of mergers, is more
likely to make mistakes during his or her occasional forays into merger
enforcement no matter how intelligent, diligent, and public-spirited the
effort?1 This disadvantage in experience is exacerbated by their lack of
relevant information. The federal enforcers have access to a tremendous
quantity of information before making enforcement decisions,80 but they
apparently cannot share this material with state enforcers. 81 Only rarely
do parties voluntarily submit material pursuant to the states' premerger
compact.

73. Merger enforcement may divert resources from more "appropriate" tasks.
74. However, assistant attorneys general for antitrust are sometimes able to borrow
attorneys from other divisions for special projects. Moreover, any state with the
determination and financial resources can hire outside counsel to litigate for them.
75. See supra notes 46-47, infra note 182. The following states have filed merger
cases: Alabama, California, Connecticut, Dlinois, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, PelUlSylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and West Virginia. This total
does not include states that only participated in multistate efforts.
76. See supra notes 46-47.
77. Only experience gives enforcers the ability to discern which types of assertions by
the merging parties are likely to be true and which are more likely to be suspect.
78. See Workload Statistics, supra note 48.
79. In addition, turnover is high among state enforcers, as it is among their federal
counterparts.
80. This is due in large part to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, 15
U.S.C. § 18a(d) (1988). This requires the submission of such documentary material and
information relevant to a proposed acquisition as is necessary and appropriate to enable the
FI'C and the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust to determine whether the acquisition
would violate the antitrust laws.
81. See Lieberman v. FrC, 771 F.2d 32, 37-38 (2d. Cir. 1985) (section 7(A)(h) of the
Clayton Act limits disclosure of premerger information to the public, including state
officials); Mattox v. FrC, 752 F.2d 116, 124 (5th Cir. 1985) (language of § 7(A)(h) and
statements of its legislative proponents preclude providing premerger material to state
attorneys general).
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Moreover. some believe that state attorneys general often have
parochial or political motives.82 including the protection of local jobs and
industries.83 As a result, some assert that state enforcement actions
sometimes are undertaken even if they cannot be justified fully on
traditional antitrust grounds.84
Another potential problem could be the most damaging of all. States
could enact antimerger statutes with different substantive goa1s8S or could

82. Some critics contend that NAAG stands not for "National Association of Attorneys
General," but instead for "National Association of Aspiring Governors." See Brockmeyer,
Report on the NAAG Multi-State Task Force, 58 ANTITRUST LJ. 215, 220 (1989). Charles
F. Ru1e, while Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, asserted that some state attorneys
general "more interested in headlines than in sound law enforcement, have begun to use
antitrust enforcement as a means of advancing their political careers." 60 Minutes with
Charles F. Rule Assistant Attorney Generat Antitrust Division, 58 ANTITRUST LJ. 377. 381
(1989) [hereinafter 60 Minutes with Rule]. He earlier alleged that state enforcers were using
"state antitrust enforcement as a vehicle for promoting the personal political ambitions of
state officials ••••" C. Ru1e, On Being Head of the Antitrust Division: The World View
of a Soon-to-be Former Assistant Attorney General, Remarks Presented Before the Antitrust
Law Section of the New York State Bar Association (Jan. 18, 1989) (on file at New York
Law School Law Review office). "State attorneys general are elected officials, and parochial
political concerns may well influence their decisions to challenge mergers. Suits may be
filed to generate favorable publicity, to prevent plants or offices from being transferred to
another state, or merely to thwart unpopu1ar acquirors, such as foreign companies •••."
Bell, supra note 2, at 39.
83. "State attorneys general use Clayton Act actions to pursue local employment
concerns, without regard to the interests of consumers nationally, or even in their own
states." Zuckerman. Courts May Not, and Should Not, Order Divestiture in Private Section
7 Cases, 4 ANTITRUST 37, 41 (1990). Helene Jaffe gave an example:
[W)hen we were going through, representing a party to an acquisition where the
states were involved, we ended up negotiating a letter agreement with three state
attorneys general. The terms of this agreement really don't bear any resemblance
to any consent order that one usually thinks about negotiating with the federal
enforcement agencies in the context of a merger. Our agreement concerned the
level of support that the company wou1d continue to provide to local suppliers
of products that the factory was using. It concerned the level of support we
wou1d give to charities and community services and community activities that the.
company had sponsored. These are different types of considerations than you are
usually negotiating over when you are at the Federal Trade Commission or the
Antitrust Division. But they are concerns particu1ar to the state AGs-they are
local in nature, and these are the things that you have to consider and worry
about when the states are involved.
Jaffe, Multi-State Compact Procedure and Pre-Merger Review, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 223, 227
(1989). Jaffe does not state whether the relief caused significant inefficiencies or
anti competitive effects.
84. See 60 Minutes with Rule, supra note 82; C. Rule, supra note 82.
85. For example, a state cou1d enact a statute with the express goals of protecting
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leiislate perverse methodologies. 86 The more these statutes differed
significantly from the existing antitrust laws, the more likely they would
be held unconstitutional.87 It is unclear, however, when this line would
be crossed,88 and even a state statute ultimately found to be
unconstitutional could do mischief during the years of uncertainty.
Many believe that these problems-whether existing or potential-are
real to the extent they are perceived of as being real since even incorrect
perceptions can lead to business uncertainty, costs, and delays. Taken as
a whole, they are said to threaten the Balkanization of the United States
economy. It is especially ironic that this fragmentation is occurring while
the European Economic Community is in the process of unification.
B. Are the Problems Real?
Despite recent increases, state merger challenges have not been
common. The states collectively appear to have never filed more than nine
merger actions per year,89 and the average number of state filings90
during even the second half of the 1980s was only approximately six per
year. 91 Moreover, much of the impetus behind the state challenges was
their percegtion that the federal enforcers should have been more
aggressive, as well as possible distrust generated by the anti-state
rhetoric and conservative philosophy emanating from certain Reagan

competitors or jobs.
86. For example, a state statute could mandate that markets be defined in some manner
that severely discriminates against the producers of imported goods.
87. A radically different merger statute could, for example, constitute an undue burden
on interstate commerce. See supra notes 24-25.
88. See Hovenkamp, supra note 27. "Congress has not declared that state antitrust laws
are legitimate only when they are identical with federal law. The doctrine of federal
supremacy applies only when an assertion of state power substantially frustrates the policies
of the federal antitrust system." Ill. at 395 (footnotes omitted).
89. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
90. Filings and actions include cases plus amicus curiae briefs and comments.
91. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text
92. However, many believe that state enforcement will not decrease as federal
enforcement increases, perhaps because the states now view themselves as being truly in the
merger enforcement business. For example, Attorney General Robert T. Stephan of Kansas
made the following remarks at the annual conference of the National Association of
Attorneys General in July, 1990: "Increased enforcement by the federal agencies docs not
mean that state enforcement efforts will recede .•.• [t]he states finally have partners to
share the enforcement burden." Federal-State Cooperation Continues To Be Major Theme
at NAAG Conference, 59 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1475, at 84 (July 19,
lQ90). For 1990 state antiroerger filings, see infra note 182.
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administration officials.93 These problems have, however, disappeared
during the Bush administration.94
While it is possible to imagine a host of serious problems arising from
two levels of enforcement, docwnenting specific instances is problematic
since, as is the case for so many nebulous antitrust issues, the side with the
burden of persuasion will usually 10se.9S It is, for example, difficult to
demonstrate that desirable, large, national transactions were not attempted
or were delayed due to the added uncertainty arising from possible state
enforcement since: (1) it is difficult to show that virtually any specific
merger is desirable;96 (2) this is especially true for mergers that did not
actually occur; (3) even if there were no potential state plaintiffs there
would have been uncertainty due to the prospect of a possible federal
challenge, and it is difficult to docwnent the increment due to the added
prospect of state chaUenges; and (4) the possibility of private challenges
also makes it difficult to ascertain any incremental uncertainty facing
merging parties due to the existence of state enforcement. It is similarly
difficult to docwnent any instance where a beneficial transaction was
blocked by a state enforcer acting primarily or largely out of a political

93. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text
94. Bush administration antitrust officials are enforcing the antimerger laws more
vigorously than were Reagan administration officials. See, e.g., P. Nelson, Reading Their
Lips: Changes in Antitrust Policy Under the Bush Administration (June 30, 1990)
(unpublished manuscript). They also have been extremely congenial in their relations with
the state enforcers. Informal federa1/state consultation, trust, and respect is starting to work
well. See 60 Minutes with Steiger, supra 57, at 6; 60 Minutes with Brockmeyer, supra note
38, at 31-32.
95. The burden of proof, however, should be on those making these assertions.

96. See, e.g., FISher & Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger En/arcement, 71
CALIF. L. REv. 1582, 1599-1624 (1983) (examining unpredictability of merger efficiencies).
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motivation,97 or with a parochial, nonlegitimate interest such as protecting
jobs in their state.lIS
As a practical matter it is extremely unlikely that a peripherally
affected state will initiate a challenge to a large nationwide merger. If a
large percentage of the sales or purchases of the merging finns are within
a state it certainly is legitimate for that state to raise a challenge. 99 Yet

97. The critics offer little or no specific evidence of such actions, noting only that the
state enforcers are politicians, most of whom are elected and will run for higher office. Of
course, many instead go into private practice. James F. Rill, currently Assistant Attorney
General in charge of the Antitrust Division, discounted the possibility that state attorneys
general often would file cases for political reasons, noting that "one must question whether
a commitment to serious antitrust enforcement can be viewed as a springboard to the
governor's mansion or the U.S. Senate." Rill, Antitrust: Where We Stand Today, 57
ANTITRuST L.J. 3, 6 (1988).
Three men of unquestionable integrity would necessarily have their motives impugned
by the argument of some of the critics. These former antitrust enforcers have gone on to
higher offices in the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of government,
respectively, yet each possesses integrity beyond question: (1) James C. Miller, ill went
from Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission to the head of the U.S. Office of
Management and Budget, (2) Douglas H. Ginsburg went from the Assistant Attorney
General of the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and (3) Thomas P. Campbell went from
Director of the Bureau of Competition of the Federal Trade Commission (via a period as
a law professor) to Representative in the U.S. Congress. See TIm AMERICAN BENCH:
JUDGES OF THE NATION 36 (M. Hough 6th ed. 1991/92) (Ginsburg); WHO'S WHO IN
AMERICA 497 (46th ed. 1990/91) (Campbell); FTC Member Appointed As Agency's Acting
Head, L.A. l1D1es, Oct. 8, 1985, § 1, at 8, col. 6 (Miller).
98. None of the sources that the author has been able to find provide such
documentation. Lloyd Constantine, while head of the NAAG Antitrust Task Force and the
Chief of New York's Antitrust Section, stated to the author that he took nontraditional
factors, such as jobs within his state, into account when attempting to decide the cases to
which he should devote his scarce enforcement resources, but only from among those cases
that also made sense on traditional economic grounds.
Similarly, critics have never documented confidentiality problems arising from state
merger enforcement. Lloyd Constantine noted that
[t]he states have an admirable, perhaps even flawless, record in maintaining the
confidentiaIity of pre-merger disclosure in the face of widespread criticism that
the NAAG Pre-Merger Disclosure Compact would compromise confidentiality.
In contrast the PrC is widely reported to.be a sieve, and at least one publication
relies on documents leaked by the PrC for its daily bread.
Constantine, supra note 6, at 38.
99. Michael Brockmeyer, fonner Chairman of the NAAG Multistate Antitrust Task
Force, concludes that states typically act only when the state has a significant interest in the
merger. He observed that because approximately 80% of the assets involved in California
v. American Stores Co., 872 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1853 (1990), were
within the state of California, the state's interest was both legitimate and foreseeable. See
60 Minutes with Brockmeyer, supra note 38, at 29.
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if only a trivial percentage of sales or purchases are within a state, that
state is very unlikely as a practical and political matter to spend the
enormous sums of money required to sustain a challenge. Moreover, most
of those instances where the challenging state is only concerned with a
small percentage of a national transaction involve retailing enterprises,lOO
and in most such circumstances a hold-separate order involving the assets
in question can be arranged relatively easily, allowing the bulk of the
transaction to proceed.10l
Every state merger challenge apparently has been filed under a federal
antitrust statute or a substantively identical state statute. 102 It is unclear
whether a state statute that was in any significant manner different from
the federal antitrust statutes would be constitutional.103 Regardless, no
state has brought a case under such a statute. Moreover, the state enforcers
regularly consult with one another and with legal academics and economic
consultants in advance of a challenge, and often work and file in groups.
For these reasons, the collective actions of the members of the NAAG
antitrust group, operating under their own substantive guidelines, are more
predictable and less error-prone than one might otherwise expect

C. Affirmative Reasons for States to Challenge Mergers
A state antitrust enforcer has the duty to protect the state (as a
purchaser), its consumers, and its economy from the potential exercise of
market power. Every private corporation that would purchase from or sell
to the postmerger corporation has the right to bring a private action. State
challenges are at least as legitimate as those brought by private fIrms since
a state is more likely to be fIling for the good of the public. A state

100. See infra note 152.
101. See, e.g., the discussion of Associated Dry Goods, infra note 150 and
accompanying text
102. See sources cited supra notes 44-47. States typically file under state statutes rather
than a substantively identical federal statute because the state statute has better discovery
or other procedures. The current Chainnan of the NAAG Multistate Antitrust Task Force,
Robert M. Langer, believes "that the next few years will witness a growing number of
challenges to mergers and acquisitions in state courts under state antitrust laws." Interview
with Robert M. lAnger, 3 INT'L MERGER L. 3 (1990).
103. Many would agree that Professor 10hn Flynn's 1964 conclusions are still valid:
While antitrust policy may be perverted by legislatures or local enforcement
officials to serve the parochial interests of local economic groups, there is no
evidence of such an occurrence. If a state were to attempt a misuse of antitrust
policy, the equal protection clause, the due process clause, the commerce clause
and federal antitrust policy provide sufficient safeguards to prevent the
Balkanization of American trade.and commerce.
1. FLYNN, supra note 62, at 247.
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attorney general would be remiss if he or she did not challenge mergers
that seemed likely to result in supracompetitive prices.
The primary task of a state attorney general is to protect the direct
interests of his or her state, its consumers and economy. Others have the
task of protecting the nation as a whole. The United States Congress could
have removed the states' prerogative when it passed the antitrust laws, but
chose not to. I04 Moreover, even the federal enforcers are not supposed
to sacrifice the interests of one or more states for the national benefit since
the Clayton Act prohibits any merger the effect of which may be
substantially to lessen competition "in any section of the country. "lOS
The Supreme Court has interpreted this literally, providing no exception for
mergers detrimentally affecting competition in one market because of
possible beneficial effects in other markets. 106 Moreover, it is extremely
difficult even to predict the existence or magnitude of efficiencies in
advance of a merger,l07 let alone to balance market power and efficiency
effects in the same geographic market to determine whether a merger is
beneficial. lOS A state enforcer would rarely, if ever, be able to ascertain
in advance whether his or her decision to challenge a merger which might
lead to market power within his or her state also might be likely to lead to
significant offsetting efficiencies elsewhere. Thus, a federal/state trade-off
is largely nonexistent.

104. As Professor Flynn observed:
It would indeed be strange if the policy of federalism, dedicated to the protection
of the individual from a concentration of political power, were ever held to deny
states the power to enforce the policy of antitrust. a policy dedicated to the
protection of the individual's economic freedom and the promotion of the
common weal by the prevention of the concentration of economic power.
ld. at 247-48.
105. Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988).
106. See United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), where the
Court stated that
[w]e are clear ..• that a merger the effect of which 'may be substantially to
lessen competition' is not saved because, on some ultimate reckoning of social
or economic debits and credits, it may be deemed beneficial. A value choice of
such magnitude is beyond the ordinary limits of judicial competence ...•
ld. at 371.
107. See FISher & Lande, supra note 96, at 1604-24 (discussing the nature, extent, and
predictability of efficiencies from mergers based on accounting data, stock market studies,
and case studies).
108. See Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. at 370; see also Fisher & Lande, supra
note 96, at 1624-77 (discussing the factors involved in balancing efficiency and market
power effects in merger enforcement).
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The framers of the antimerger laws had a set of goals 109 that many
members of the antitrust community believed were misinterpreted by
certain Reagan administration enforcers. uo The state attorneys general
apparently believed that the federal enforcers were not adequately carrying
out the will of the Congresses that passed the merger laws and were not
faithfully implementing the decisions of the Supreme Court. 111 Even if
these state attorneys general believe that national merger policy is best
made and implemented by the federal antitrust enforcers, they could also
believe that a "second best" solution might sometimes be warranted. u2

109. See generally Lande, Wealth Transfers As the Original and Primary Concern of
Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation' Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982) (discussing
Congress's goals in enacting the antitrust laws).
110. See Krattenmaker & Pitofsky, supra note 41.
Ill. For example, Assistant Attorney General J. Paul McGrath announced that he was
evaluating mergers under a Shennan Act standard. See Henderson, Baldridge Merger Plan
Criticized, Washington Post, Mar. 3, 1985, at F1, col. 6. His successor, Douglas Ginsburg,
wrote that the department should evaluate mergers under a "criminal law standard" which
presumably would require that the government not challenge a merger unless it was sure,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the merger would be anticompetitive. See Ginsburg, The
Appropriate Role of the Antitrust Enforcement Agencies, 9 CARDozo L. REv. 1277, 1283
(1988). The state attorneys general apparently concluded that when Congress included an
incipiency provision with the Clayton Act it meant for mergers to be prosecuted more
aggressively than a Shennan Act or criminal standard would allow. See Barnes, supra note
50, at 264 n.3; Lande, supra note 109, at 136 n.274.
112. The federal antitrust enforcers appear to have engaged in similar "second best"
law enforcement when they targeted relatively local matters that are most appropriately
within the states' domain. For example, in 1988 the Federal Trade Commission approved
consent orders against five obstetricians in Aquidneck Island, Rhode Island, who were
alleged to be colluding to obtain additional medicare revenue. See In re O'HalIoran, 5
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) , 22,543 (Aug. 26, 1988). Second, in 1985 the Federal Trade
Commission challenged anticompetitive aspects of the taxicab regulatory systems of New
Orleans and Minneapolis. See In re City of Minneapolis, 105 F.T.C. 304 (May 7, 1985);
In re City of New Orleans, 105 F.T.C. 1 (Jan. 3, 1985) (the author was involved in the
taxicab actions when he worked at the FrC).
The FrC probably would have preferred that the respective state attorneys general had
handled these relatively local problems. But since the states did not do so, ilie federal
enforcers intervened. The federal enforcers in effect determined that they knew best how
to regulate (or deregulate) taxicabs in Minneapolis and New Orleans, and whether it was
a good idea to prosecute five obstetricians in Aquidneck Island, Rhode Island. Even though
on the merits of each case the FrC was right, these suits constituted an intrusion into
relatively local affairs by the federal enforcers.
For extensive documentation concerning federal suits involving essentially local
matters, see Appendix: Indictments and Complaints Filed By the Antitrust Division of the
Department ofJustice, Involving Essentially Local Restraints of Trade, J. FLYNN, supra note
62, at 251-312 (concluding that, for complaints filed in 1957 through 1967, 148 out of the
417 complaints and indictments filed-35.49%-involved essentially local restraints of trade).
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They might believe that it would be better for the policies of Congress and
the Supreme Court to be implemented bX state attorneys general than to be
misconstrued by the federal enforcers.! 3
State activism currently might be especially important in light of the
last decade's steep cutbacks in the federal enforcement agencies'
budgets,114 despite a rapid increase in the number of large mergers. liS At
the same time, standing has become more difficult for private plaintiffs to
obtain. 116 In light of these changes, Congress's decision to provide the
state enforcers as a "back up" system has proven to be a wise one.ll7

ill. A PROPOSED REsOLUTION OF COMPETING CONCERNS
Some of the problems associated with two levels of enforcement could
arise if states remained free to initiate any merger challenges. But others,
includin~ the most important, could be minimized if each state agreed
usuallyll to refrain from challenging specified exceptionally large, truly

113. See 60 Minutes with Brockmeyer, supra note 38, at 38.
114. State antitrust enforcement resources also are extremely limited. It is possible,
however, that favorable publicity from a successful merger action would result in a net
increase in a state's available antitrust resources.
115. Michael Brockmeyer, while chairman of the NAAG Antitrust Multi-State Task
Force, provided this as a reason for state activism. He observed that federal antitrust
resources declined by approximately 50% during the 19808. He also noted that in 1979
there were 861 premerger filings under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, of which the federal
government challenged 28. By contrast, in 1987 the federal government challenged 14 of
2533 premerger filings. Brockmeyer, States and Private Parties Must Be Able to Obtain
Divestiture, 4 ANTITRUST 37,39 (1990); see also P. Nelson, supra note 94, at 8-10; Rill
Laments Funding Shortfall As Shadow on Division's Program, 58 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) No. 1469, at 874 (June 7, 1990) (discussing decrease in federal premerger
notification filings).
116. See Cargill Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986) (although the
Court did not completely deny private plaintiffs standing to challenge acquisitions on
predatory-pricing theories, it held that to obtain injunctive relief plaintiff must show a real
threat of antitrust injury).
117. As Justice Powell noted generally, "[t]he Framers believed that the separate sphere
of sovereignty reserved to the States would ensure that the States would serve as an
effective 'counterpoise' to the power of the Federal Government." Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 571 (1985) (powell, J., dissenting).
118. Additional certainty would arise if the states would announce that they would
"never" challenge certain categories of mergers. Guidelines, however, are rarely written in
such absolutist language, and despite the absence of absolutist language in the DOJ Merger
Guidelines and the general caveat that the enforcers may make exceptions, this document
does serve to increase business certainty. The states, moreover, would be unlikely to agree
to such a strong statement. See, e.g., supra note 69 for the provision in the current NAAG
Merger Guidelines that states may vary their implementation of the Guidelines somewhat,
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national transactions, and transactions that primarily do not affect that
state. 1l9 If the statesl20 were effectively to concede enforcement and
nonenforcement decisions for these mergers to the FTC and the
Department of Justice, it might be appropriate for the federal enforcers
normally to decline to scrutinize mergers having their primary impact on
only one state. Since many states have neither the resources nor expertise
to evaluate mergers,121 the federal enforcers should not identify any
group of mergers, no matter how small or localized, that they will never
challenge. They should only announce that for certain categories of
mergers they will defer to state judgments whenever practicable.
Accordingly, the National Association of Attorneys General, the FTC, and
the DO] should attempt to agree upon "Federalism Guidelines" that would
divide potential mergers into: (1) areas of federal responsibility where
states virtually always would decline to challenge mergers; (2) areas of
primary state responsibility; and (3) areas of shared responsibility. This
allocation would start from the premise that the DOl and the FTC are to
be our primary national antimerger enforcers. l22
The state and federal enforcers have formed a workinJ group to
coordinate and improve federal/state merger enforcement, 1 Although
in accordance with their exercise of prosecutorial discretion. If a state did challenge a
merger despite its general acceptance of Federalism Guidelines that suggested that a
challenge would nonnally not be forthcoming under the circumstances, the challenged
parties would be able to point this out to the presiding judge. In an otherwise close case,
the judge might be inclined to accept the argument that, despite the generic caveat in the
front of the Guidelines that the states are free to make exceptions, the state should be "held
to its own guidelines," and the judge might be less inclined to block the merger. [d.
119. If many states declined to agree to a division of primary responsibility, the
Federalism Guidelines would be less likely to increase business certainty. More generally,
some merging finns might of course be able to adjust their transaction somewhat to cause
it to be evaluated by the preferred level of evaluator(s).
120. Cities and counties sometimes have the authority to challenge mergers, particularly
if they are a direct purchaser of the products in question. Cities and counties should forego
initiating any challenges that the state they are within has agreed to forego.
121. States also typically lack the information on each merger that the federal enforcers
obtain under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18a(d) (1988);
see also supra notes 73-79,81-83 and accompanying text.
122. As Michael Brockmeyer observed while head of NAAG's Antitrust Task Force,
[n]o one can dispute the overall primacy of the federal agencies in merger
enforcement •••. The states have never questioned that. Indeed, I think you will
find that in virtually all the state merger prosecutions, there was an attempt, in
the first instance, to defer to the federal government. In American Stores,
California didn't sue until after the Commission had finished its review of that
transaction.
60 Minutes with Brockmeyer, supra note 38, at 39.
123. They have formed an Executive Working Group that is attempting to devise
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they are pursuing many possible avenues of cooperation, one of their
primary goals 124 is to unify the existing substantive merger guidelines of
the DOJ,12S the NAAG,I26 and the FI'C.127 If this substantive
unification succeeds, the working group should next consider a division of
primary merger responsibilities along the lines suggested by this article.
The "Federalism Guidelines" could be the preface to the new Unified
Merger Guidelines. Even if the enforcers cannot agree upon identical
substantive guidelines, each could insert an identical division of primary
responsibility into its own document.

A. Areas of Federal Responsibility
1. Exceptionally Large Mergers with a National Dimension
When exceptionally large firms operating nationwide desire to merge,
the decision as to whether there is a governmental interest in challenging
the merger should usually be made by federal, not state, enforcers. 128
Whether such transactions should be scrutinized closely, generally
forbidden or restricted, or treated leniently are fundamental national
economic policy questions. If the United States is to continue to have a
truly integrated national market and a national policy towards important
industrial issues, the states should play little role in these enforcement
decisions. 129 The federal enforcers, appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate, are more likely to reflect national
concerns than the state attorneys general, whose tasks are to protect state
concerns.

mechanisms to ensure that cooperation will continue. Id. at 32.
124. Id. at 35.
125. Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Revised Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg.
26,823, 26,827 (1984).
126. NAAG Merger Guidelines, supra note 49.
127. The Federal Trade Commission document calls itself a "Statement" rather than
"Guidelines." See FTC Statement Concerning Horizontal Mergers, 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) , 13,200 (1988). The Statement gives considerable weight to the DOJ Guidelines
in evaluating horizontal mergers. Id.
128. Whether private parties should continue to have standing to challenge
exceptionally large transactions with a national dimension is beyond the scope of this article.
One of the reasons why antitrust embodies the "private attomey general" concept may be
the suspicion that the federal enforcers will not always vigorously enforce the antitrust laws.
To the extent state enforcement is vigilant, this argument loses some validity.
129. The states would, of course, continue to play an indirect role through their elected
representatives in Washington, D.C., and through their ability to supply infonnation to the
federal antitrust enforcers.

1990]

FEDERAL/STATE BALANCE

1075

The European Economic Community has determined that exceptionally
large mergers with a "Community dimension" should generally be
evaluated at the Community level, not by individual member nations. 130
The EEC Merger Regulations that went into effect in September of 1990
provide that a transaction will be considered to have a "Community
dimension" when (1) total worldwide sales 131 of the parties exceeds 5
billion ECU (approximately $5.7 billion), and (2) at least two parties to the
transaction each have sales within the EEC that exceed 250 million ECU
(approximately $280 million). The EEC Merger Regulations contain three
exceptions under which individual member nations are free to initiate
challenges: (1) where each of the parties have more than two-thirds of their
EEC sales within the same member state, that state can challenge the
merger; (2) the EEC Merger Commission has the discretion to refer
mergers to member nations for action after the member state notifies the
Commission that a merger threatens competition in a distinct market within
that member state;132 and (3) a nation can challenge a merger when that
nation believes that such action is necessary to "protect legitimate interests
other than those taken into consideration by the [BEC Merger]
Regulation-such as [p]ublic security, plurality of the media and prudential
rules [for financial institutions].,,133
The Merger Commission predicts that approximately fifty mergers
each year will exceed the thresholds in the Regulations. 134 These
thresholds for defIning transactions with a "Community dimension" are to
be reviewed by no later than December 21, 1993, and the Commission has
stated its opinion that the aggregate worldwide sales requirement for the
merging fums should drop from 5 billion ECU to 2 billion (approximately
$2.3 billion) and that the threshold for sales of each of two or more parties

130. See Council Regulation No. 4064/89, 32 0.1. BUR. COMM. (No. L 395) art. 5, 'at
5 (1989) [hereinafter Council Regulation]. I am grateful to Harry Katricious for comments
on this section of this article.
131. The Regulations actually are framed in tenDS of "turnover," a concept similar but
not identical to sales. See id. at 5 (calculation of turnover).
132. If the Commission concludes that no such distinct market exists or that the alleged
threat to competition does not exist it need not refer the matter to the member nation. ld.
at 7; B. Hawk & M. Weiner, BEe Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between
Undertakings 30-31 (Feb. 1990) (unpublished manuscript) (on file at New York Law School
Law Review office).
133. B. Hawk & M. Weiner, supra note 132, at 33; Hawk, The EEC Merger
Regulation: The First Step Toward One-Stop Merger Control, 59 .ANTITRUST L.1. 195,20809 (1990).

134. CCH Commentary: Community-WuIe Merger Control, 2 Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH)' 2843, at 2099-7 (Nov. 1990) [hereinafter Commentary]. This number is likely to
increase as community-wide merger activity increases and if the thresholds outlined therein
are reduced. ld.
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to the transaction should dr0R from 300 million ECU to 100 million
(approximately $110 million). 5
The United States should consider adopting a similar approach to
exceptionally large mergers with a national dimension. One could argue
that the thresholds the United States should implement should be lower
than those adopted by the EEe since states within the United States surely
should play less of a role in the United States' economy than individual
European nations should play within the EEe. Regardless, the particular
thresholds selected for the EEe Merger Regulations were
compromises,l36 and a similar compromise between federal and state
enforcers would have to occur within the United States as well. Perhaps a
mix of the EEe's current and possible post-1993 thresholds might be
appropriate for the United States to adopt initially.137
One possible problem with the particulars of the EEe approach is that
it focuses upon the total sales of the transacting fIrms,138 rather than their
sales in any market that might be of interest for antitrust purposes. 139
This approach has the advantage of great clarity since fIrms will know
their total sales with much more certainty than their sales in any market
ultimately deemed "relevant" for antitrust purposes. Nevertheless, it could
lead to some transactions that are small from an antitrust perspective being

135. See Hawk. supra note 133, at 208 & n.37; B. Hawk & M. Weiner, supra note
132, at 29·30.
136. For example, Barry Hawk notes that member states without well-developed
merger enforcement systems had a "preference for lower thresholds (e.g., one or two billion
ECU rather than five billion ECU) that would have subjected more transactions to the
mandatory jurisdiction of the Merger Regulation." Hawk, supra note 133, at 227. The new
merger regulation reportedly was negotiated for more than 16 yearsl See EC Commission
Officials Stress Readiness/or New Merger Regime, 59 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 1484, at 465 (Sept. 27, 1990) [hereinafter New Merger Regime].
137. The use of a threshold similar to that used by the EEC would have the added
benefit of signalling that the United States views itself as a competitor in a world market
and that a merger that seems large for the Community also is large for the United States.
Moreover, it might sometimes be difficult to determine in advance if a particular merger
would be subject to United States antimerger laws, to EEC antimerger laws, or to both. To
the extent the standards are identical, it would matter less which entity had jurisdiction.
138. If only part of a corporation will be acquired, the regulations do focus only upon
the sales of those portions of the firm. See Council Regulation. supra note 131, at 5. It is
unclear whether the sales of a division of the acquiror, instead of the entire acquiror, would
be used in calculating whether a transaction exceeds the thresholds. "Other problems that
could surface include whether the sale of a branch or division of one company to another
is a 'concentration' covered by the regulation. As one Commission official pointed out, it
could simply represent a 'sale of property,' but the decision will 'depend on the individual
case.'" New Merger Regime, supra note 136, at 465.
139. A similar criticism was made in ABA Comments, supra note 57, at 252·53.
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classified as having Community dimensions. If one very large firm with a
$10 million widget division merged with anotlier very large firm with a
$10 million widget division, and the two firms had only widgets in
common, this transaction appears to be one that would have a Community
dimension for merger purposes, even though the size of the merging
widget divisions suggests that this merger's antitrust effects are small.
Antitrust issues in the United States are decided upon a market-bymarket basis, not according to the size of the transacting parties, since
competitive effects are felt on a market-by-market basis. l40 The
Federalism Guidelines also should be crafted in terms of relevant
markets,141 whenever the markets in question could be readily segregated
from the remainder of the transaction. While this would sacrifice clarity
compared to the EEC approach, it would avoid classifying large
transactions with minor, segregable overlaps as mergers with a national
antitrust dimension.
There might, however, be potentially anticompetitive components of
national transactions that could not readily be segregated from the
remainder of the transactions. Suppose, for example, that two nationwide
$5 billion computer companies attempt to merge, and that the transaction
would give rise to potentially anticompetitive effects in one relevant
nationwide $500 million market in which each of the merging firms sold
$100 million of goods. If the relevant market that could become
anticompetitive could not be segregated from the remainder of' the
transaction this should not, of course, immunize the transaction from
antitrust scrutiny. 142 Such a merger should nevertheless fairly be
considered a "national transaction" and therefore within the federal area of
responsibility. The Federalism Guidelines should classify segregable assets
on a market-by-market basis, while nondivisible transactions should be
classified as a whole.
Something similar to the first EEC exception for mergers when both
parties have more than two-thirds of their sales within a single state143
almost certainly would be insisted upon by the states, although the state
and the federal enforcers might want to change its particulars. Some
undoubtedly would desire to expand the exception, perhaps by lowering its

140. Only if we care about size for its own sake would the size of the corporate parents
be relevant.
141. If the thresholds in the United States Federalism Guidelines were designed in
terms of relevant markets, the appropriate monetary thresholds should be lower than if they
were designed in terms of the overall transaction.
142. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371-72 (1963)
(stating that even if a merger may produce some beneficial effects in one market, it may not
proceed if it may substantially lessen competition in another relevant market).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 131-32.
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threshold to a 51 % standard144 or by allowing groups of states to
aggregate sales within those states to arrive at the two-thirds threshold. 145
The United States should consider adopting the EEC's general approach
concerning this type of exception,146 with the particulars subject to
federal-state negotiation.
The EEC's second exception, allowing for possible challenges by
member nations to mergers causing problems in distinct geographic
markets within member nations,147 seems an appropriate one for the
United States as well. The overriding purpose of the EEC Merger
Regulations is to have most exceptionally large transactions with a
Community dimension be handled at the Community level. Suppose,
however, that a large transaction produced an isolated competitive overlap
that could be cured through a divestiture that would not significantly affect
the rest of the transaction. 148 It is unlikely that the states would give up

144. The exception could provide that when both companies have a majority of their
sales within the same state, that state should be the primary scrutinizer of the merger.
145. In recent years many important antitrust cases were filed by groups of states and
there is every reason to believe that this trend will continue. If there is a merger that
disproportionately affected a related group of states they would of course consider joint
action, and it could be argued that it would be appropriate to aggregate the merging fmns'
sales within states that file together. For example, suppose that 30% of the crab pots sold
within the United States were sold to residents in the states on the Chesapeake Bay.
Suppose that Maryland and Virginia citizens each purchase 15% of the crab pots sold within
the United States, but that the Federalism Guidelines have deemed that 15% of sales does
not quite meet the "disproportionate interest" standard. If Virginia and Maryland agreed
that the transaction would be likely to detrimentally affect both their economies and filed
jointly, the firms' sales in both states arguably should be aggregated in which case they
might exceed the disproportionate impact threshold. The Federalism Guidelines suggested
in this article do not, however, permit aggregation of states' shares. To do so would mean
that some aggregation of states could potentially be found to challenge any merger and the
Federalism Guidelines would provide much less business certainty.
146. One could use assets in addition to or instead of sales. The EEC focus on sales
should, however, be adopted because a focus on assets could encourage states to protect
loca1jobs.

147. See supra text accompanying notes 131-33.
148. For example, the Associated Dry Goods-May Co. transaction involved two large
nationwide chains of department stores. See Pennsylvania v. May Dep't Stores, 1986-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) , 67,304 (W.D. Pa. 1986). Associated Dry Goods, with 1985 sales of
$3.774 billion and projected 1986 sales in the Pittsburgh metropolitan area of $260 million,
attempted to purchase May Department Stores, with 1985 sales of $5.028 billion and
projected 1986 sales in the Pittsburgh metropolitan area of $169 million.
This would have led to an isolated possibly anti competitive overlap in Pittsburgh.
After the transaction was challenged by the City of Pittsburgh and the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, the vast bulk of the transaction was permitted to proceed while the small
overlap in the Pittsburgh metropolitan area-approximately 3.4% of the overall
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the right to challenge such mergers. The major drawback with such an
exception, however, is that it often would be difficult to determine in
advance whether the assets at issue could be segregated and held separate
without threatening the overall transaction, especially if an industry other
than retailing is involved. 149 When it would be relatively easy to fashion
a hold-separate order, however, it would seem reasonable to treat the
segregable assets as a separate merger for federalism purposes, and allow
the states to challenge that portion of the-merger. ISO
The United States thus should adopt an exception similar to the EEe
exception for mergers affecting a distinct market within a member nation,
except that the United States exception should perhaps be narrower and
only apply if the assets in question could be readily segregated and held
separate from the overall transaction. The Federalism Guidelines should
provide that such challenges should always be available to the states, since
it is highly unlikely they would agree to the discretionary nature of the
EEe provision.
It would, admittedly, often be difficult for the merging firms to be able
to predict in advance whether the assets that a state would attempt to have
held separate would be considered by the state enforcers to be relatively
segregable, or whether they might be of the type that would be crucial to
the transaction. One partial answer might be for the Federalism Guidelines
to create a rebuttable presumption that a merger consisting largely of
retailing assets1S1 would be considered relatively segregable, and a
rebuttable presumption that a merger consisting largely of nonretailing

transaction-was held separate. After a brief trial, the parties agreed to divest the disputed
Pittsburgh assets. ld. at' 61,552.
149. In some cases segregation would be difficult or impossible. Suppose two
nationwide manufacturing finns, one with a single plant in New York, the other with a
single plant in California. want to merge, and that the state of Maryland is the only state
that believes that its consumers would be detrimentally affected. It would probably be
impossible to fashion a limited hold-separate order that would protect Maryland consumers
without unraveling the entire transaction.
150. For example, the author was following the Associated Dry Goods-May Co.
transaction for an arbitrage client and concluded, using publicly available data, that only
approximately 5% of the transaction's assets were in the Pittsburgh metropolitan area. Since
the disputed assets involved a group of department stores, I was able to advise my client
with great confidence that the parties could relatively easily segregate and frame a holdseparate order for the disputed assets that would not endanger the bulk of the transaction_
151. I am grateful to Michael Brockmeyer for suggesting the special focus on retailing
mergers. If the Federalism Guidelines limited or presumptively limited state suits to
retailers, then "retailing" would have to be defined. "Retailing" probably should be defined
to include all direct sales to consumers. This definition should take in such services as
airline transportation since these services are sold to consumers by the finns that produce
them.
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assets would not be considered segregable. Since most of the state suits
involved retailing assets,IS2 this presumption would enable the states to
challenge many of the mergers of greatest interest to them in a way that
increased business certainty. lS3
The final EEe exception, however, is unwise. If states are permitted
to challenge mergers to protect "other legitimate interests," this could
encourage state decisions based on such illegitimate interests as protecting
local jobs. l54 These and other factors that formerly played a
counterproductive role in United States merger enforcement could be
resurrected by such an exception. ISS
If these thresholds and exceptions were combined, subject to the
modifications discussed, the resulting portion of the Federalism Guidelines
could describe one area of virtually exclusive federal responsibility as
follows:
1.

Areas of federal responsibility, in which states will virtually
never challenge mergers.
Mergers will be classified intQ the following categories on a
market-by-market basis if most of the assets at issue readily
can be segregated and held separate from the remainder of the
transaction. There is a rebuttable presumption that retailing
assets can be so segregated, and that nonretailing assets
cannot. If the assets potentially giving rise to the
anticompetitive concerns cannot readily be so segregated, the
merger will be classified and evaluated as a whole to
determine whether it is within the following categories:

A. Exceptionally large mergers with a national dimension,
defmed as mergers for which

152. William J. Haynes, Jr. examined 22 state merger actions filed from 1984 through
1989 and concluded that 18 (82%) involved retailing. W. Haynes, Remarks at the 29th
Annual Advanced Antitrust Seminar, Mergers, Markets, and Joint Ventures, Practicing Law
Institute Conference (Dec. 1, 1989).
153. If the Guidelines did create this rebuttable presumption, a difficult issue would be
to determine how this presumption would be overcome. The merging parties would be free
to attempt to convince the state enforcers that the retailing assets in question could not
readily be segregated. The states similarly should be able to sometimes conclude that
nonretailing assets could readily be segregated from the bulk of a transaction.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 83 and 133.
155. For examples of such counterproductive challenges, see generally Fisher & Lande,
supra note 96, and at 1582 n.5, 1593-96, in particular.
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1. Aggregate worldwide sales of both firms combined
exceed $2.0 billion; and
2. The merging companies each have worldwide sales of
at least $250 million; except that
3. A state is not foreclosed from challenging a portion
of any merger if the assets giving rise to the
potentially anticompetitive problems readily could be
segregated and held separate from the remainder of
the transaction without causing the overall transaction
to be abandoned; and
4. A state may challenge any merger if more than twothirds of both firms' sales or purchases are within that
state.

This approach arbitrarily uses approximately the EEC's projected post1993 threshold for aggregate sales of the merging firms, and the EEC's
current threshold for the sales of each company.156 The two-thirds
exception has been expanded slightly to include purchases as well as sales
since monopsony or oligopsony could sometimes be a concern. 1S7 The
suggested test uses worldwide sales, instead of national sales, since
companies with significant exports are more of a national than a state
concern. ISS The suggested test would not permit states to challenge minor
overlaps within that state if doing so would be likely to scuttle the entire
national transaction.
If the states agreed to this provision they would be making a major
concession. They would be agreeing not to challenge many-perhaps
most-of the very largest national mergers. 1S9
156. Reasonable people obviously could select significantly higher or lower levels. The
levels ultimately selected would of course be a compromise, and not necessarily the same
compromise that the nations within the EEC negotiated (and will renegotiate). "The
thresholds have been set at a relatively high level-in fact higher than was originally
proposed by the Commission and was desired by some Member States (principally the ones
with underdeveloped national merger controls}-but only for an initial period." Commentary,
supra note 134, at 2099-7.
157. The relevant market would be the location of the purchaser(s) of the product in
question or, if monopsony were the issue, the location of the sellers of the potentially
monopsonized products.
158. This should not create a presumption that markets will be defined to be
worldwide.
159. States could still be left the option of filing amicus curiae briefs in any federal or
private challenge.
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2. Mergers That Do Not Disproportionately Affect a State
Our nation's economic policy might also be well served if states
voluntarily refrained from challenging any merger unless that merger
.disproportionately affected the challenging state. Many mergers smaller
than those defined to have a "national dimension" are still basically
national transactions whose impact will be felt throughout the country.
Unless there is some special reason why a state is disproportionately
affected by such a transaction it usually should defer enforcement decisions
for these mergers to the most affected state(s) or to the federal
'
enforcers. 160
As a practical matter states rarely if ever challenge transactions that do
not have a significant and disproportionate effect on that state. 161
Currently a merger counselor can only advise his or her clients in general
terms that most states are unlikely to scrutinize transactions that do not
disproportionately affect that state. The Federalism Guidelines might be
able to increase business certainty by delineating specific categories of
mergers that relatively unaffected states would usually not challenge. The
purpose of the disproportionate impact standard is to provide
noncontroversial transactions with the virtual certainty that most states will
not initiate a challenge. Using these screens, attorneys advising a large,
nationwide transaction might be able to quickly ascertain that forty-eight
states will not initiate a challenge. The merging firms could then focus
their attention on the two remaining states.
For the reasons given above,162 the disproportionate imgact standards
probably should apply separately to each relevant market,1 which could

160. Interestingly, at least one state antitrust law is based upon this general principle.
The Massachusetts antitrust law applies only to activities that "occur and have their
competitive impact primarily and predominantly within the commonwealth and at most, only
incidentally outside New England." MAss. GEN. L. ch. 93, § 3 (1991).
161. California was the state most likely to challenge the American Stores-Lucky
Stores transaction even though it also affected many other states, since approximately 73%
of Lucky's Stores were located within California. See California's Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari at 3, California v. American Stores Co., 110 S. Ct. 1853 (1990).
The Texaco-Getty merger may have been a rare example of a huge transaction that
primarily affected one state. Texaco, Inc. offered $10.1 billion for Getty Oil Co. in 1984,
at the time the largest merger in history. Most of Getty's assets were located within
California, and the transaction was believed by some to have the potential for detrimentally
affecting competition within several California and West Coast markets. See State ex rei.
Van de Kamp v. Texaco, Inc., 46 Cal. 3d 1147, 1174-76,762 P.2rl 385, 402-04, 252 Cal.
Rptr. 221, 238-40 (1988) (Mosk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 140-41.
163. As noted earlier, this exception often would cause uncertainty since market
definition frequently is unclear in advance of a transaction.
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be international, national, regional, statewide or local, so long as the
portion of a transaction in ~uestion could be held separate from the
remainder of the transaction. l If the states were to agree to this type of
provision they would be agreeing to forego challenging many sizeable
transactions. Many large transactions that could have a detrimental effect
on particular states would not lend themselves to hold-separate orders
involving primarily the assets alleged to cause the anticompetitive
problems. For these transactions, each state would invoke its prosecutorial
discretion by leaving enforcement decisions to the federal enforcers or the
disproportionately affected states. The Federalism Guidelines might
embody these concerns by providing that a state would virtually always
refrain from challenging:
B. Mergers that do not disproportionately affect that state. A
merger will not be considered to disproportionately affect
a state unless
1. At least 25% of the sales or purchases in the relevant
market in question are within that state; or
2. The sales or purchases within a state are more than
five times that state's proportionate share of the
United States population (or the population of any
region of the U.S. that constitutes a relevant
geographic market for .the product market in
question); notwithstanding the above
3. The sales or purchases in the relevant market(s) being
challenged, of the merging firms combined, must
exceed $5 million. If more than two-thirds of the
purchases or sales at issue are within the same state,
however, that state-may challenge the merger even if
it is below the $5 million threshold; except that

164. This would mean that if the Federalism Guidelines had been in effect, the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania would have been free to challenge that portion of the
Associated Dry Goods-May Co. transaction that was located in the Pittsburgh metropolitan
area, so long as the Pittsburgh metropolitan area constituted a relevant geographic market
and so doing would not seriously risk stopping the entire transaction. Since only
approximately 3.4% of the transaction was significantly affected (see supra note 148), and
it was relatively easy to hold these retailing assets separate, the challenge would have been
appropriate under the proposed Federalism Guidelines. By contrast, if 50% of the
transaction had been the subject of a state antitrust challenge, a hold separate order
concerning the disputed assets might well have caused the entire transaction to fail.
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4. A state is not foreclosed from challenging a portion
of any merger if the merger would be likely to cause
harm to a discrete market within that state and if
most of the assets in dispute could readily be
segregated and held separate from the remainder of
the transaction. There is a rebuttable presumption that
retailing assets can be so segregated, and that
nonretailing assets cannot. If the assets can be
segregated and held separate, the tests in subparts
B(l) through B(3) above will be applied to these
assets.
The 25 % threshold is meant to be the primary identifier of markets of
particular concern to the larger states. It is, of course, arbitrary and other
figures could be used. l65 Provision 2 would be of most concern to the
less populous states;l66 without it they would be excluded from
challenging many mergers that disproportionately affected them, a position
they would be unlikely to agree to. I67 The $5 million threshold is
partially redundant but may provide additional certainty that a challenge
will not be forthcoming in many instances. It is meant to apply regardless
of whether the first or second prong is used, as a way to prevent a state

165. One could imagine a number of possibilities, including allowing a state to
challenge when: (1) there are no interstate effects; (2) there are no direct interstate sales
or purchases; "(3) more than 50% of sales and/or purchases are within that state; (4) the
transaction would have a disproportionately high impact on that state; (5) the transaction
would have at least a proportionate effect on that state; (6) direct sales or purchases were
made within that state; or (7) the transaction would have any effect on that state.
166. The "five times" standard is, of course, arbitrary. It was selected ouly to illustrate
the type of test that could be employed to ensure that no state would challenge a transaction
unless it disproportionately affected that state.
167. Some mergers, especially those involving the retailing and consumer-goods
markets that state attorneys general are most likely to challenge, might only give rise to
antitrust issues in a relatively segregable relevant market entirely within one state so no
calculations to determine disproportionate impact would be required. See, e.g., the
discussion of Associated Dry Goods-May Co., supra note 164. Other mergers would
require some calculations to determine whether a state challenge would be permitted under
the Federalism Guidelines.
For example, suppose that a merger concerned a relevant market that was national in
scope and the states of Maryland and California, with approximately 2% and 12% of the
national population, respectively, were examining the transaction closely. Maryland would
decline to challenge the transaction unless there existed some relevant market for which at
least 10% (the lesser of 5 x 2% and 25%) of the sales were to Maryland customers.
California would decline to challenge the transaction unless at least 25% (the lesser of 5 x
12% and 25%) of the sales were to California customers.
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from initiating challenges when only a de minimis amount of the
transaction affects that state. 168
B. Areas of Primary State Responsibility
The federal enforcers are acknowledged to be our nation's prim~
antimerger enforcers; the state enforcers have never contested this. 1 9
Moreover, many states have little or no antitrust enforcement capability,
and most states have never brought a merger case. 170 In addition, the
federal Hart-Scott-Rodino premerger notification program ensures that the
federal enforcers often will have crucial data that the state enforcers
lack. 171 Accormngly, it would never be prudent for the federal enforcers
to announce that there are certain categories of mergers for which they will
always defer to state enforcement or nonenforcement decisions.

168. Several related approaches were considered and rejected. The tests that this article
is suggesting focus on sales or purchases, not assets, state of incorporation or location of
corporate headquarters. A focus on anything other than purchases or sales could encourage
states to focus on jobs or otherwise to engage in parochial protective measures that should
not affect antitrust decisions (of course, a state certainly could select, from among the group
of cases that meet the thresholds and cause traditional antitrust injury, those cases that also
will preserve or increase employment within the state; a state would be free to devote its
scarce prosecutorial resources to such cases).
Nor do the tests that this article suggest focus upon the market shares of the merging
parties within a state. They instead focus upon the percentage of the relevant market that
is sold or purchased in that state.
The suggested tests do not allow states to aggregate purchases or sales to surmount a
threshold. If states could combine to exceed, for example, the 25% threshold, the Guidelines
would provide very little certainty to merging parties that there would not be a challenge.
The suggested tests dQ not limit the states to retailers. Many state challenges concern
retailers and these mergers are more likely to have a disparate impact on individual states.
Nevertheless, other mergers can disproportionately affect particular states, and such states
should not be foreclosed from scrutinizing these mergers.
169. See, e.g., 60 Minutes with Brockmeyer, supra note 38.
170. To the best of my knowledge only 21 states have filed a merger action since 1980.
See supra note 75•. Other states may, however, have antitrust attorneys on staff with merger
experience acquired elsewhere, or may have participated in multistate enforcement actions.
For example, Eugene Waye, longtime Assistant Attorney General in charge of antitrust for
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, had extensive experience with merger enforcement
before he accepted this position.
Any state with enough determination and money can hire outside counsel with the
necessary expertise to investigate and litigate. For example, Pennsylvania and the City of
Pittsburgh hired Buchanan and Ingersol to help challenge the Associated Dry Goods-May
Co. transaction. But only state officials can make the determination whether to sue, and
these determinations can best be made wisely by people with substantial experience.
171. See supra notes 80-81.
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It might, however, be possible to identify categories of mergers for
which able and willing states should be given primary enforcement
responsibility. The states could be responsible for mergers that primarily
affect only that state, unless the merger is so large as to have a national
dimension. Moreover, mergers that do not affect interstate commerce
cannot be challenged by the federal enforcers,l72 and at least one court
would go further since it held that a substantially sized market is required
for a Clayton Act violation. 173 If this court is correct, even mergers
involving combined sales by the merging firms within a single relevant
market of more than $3 million ~r year174 might have to be evaluated
solely under state antitrust laws. 17 Regardless whether this is correct, the
Federalism Guidelines could consider delegating primary enforcement
responsibility to the states in the following manner:
II. Areas of primary state responsibility.
Many states lack the resources to challenge mergers. Except
for mergers that do not affect interstate commerce, the federal
enforcers often must continue to play the primary enforcement
role.

172. The Federal Trade Commission can challenge mergers "in or affecting commerce."
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988).
173. In United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 908 F.2d
981 (D.C. Cir. 1990), the court stated that "[t]he minuscule size of the market creates
problems for the government's case, because one element of a Section 7 violation is that
'[t]he market [affected] must be substantial. '" ld. at 9 (quoting United States v. E.I. du Pont
de Nemons & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 595 (1957». The du Pont opinion did not elaborate. It
merely cited Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 357 (1922),
which states that an arrangement would not violate the Clayton Act unless it "substantially
lessened competition." ld. It does not require a substantial amount of commerce. Thus, the
Baker Hughes and du Pont requirement of a substantially sized market is probably in error.
174. In Baker Hughes, Oy Tamella AB, a Fmnish corporation, sought to acquire
Secoma, a French corporation, owned by Baker Hughes. Baker Hughes, 731 F. Supp. at 4.
Oy Tamella's Tamrock division and Secoma were competing major industrial concerns with
business in a variety of mining products in various countries. ld. Secoma had sales over a
three year period of 18 or 19 rigs worth $2.5 million, while Tamrock sold between 33 and
42 rigs. ld. at 9. Tamrock's interrogatories indicated 33 rigs sold and valued at
approximately $7.8 million, while internal documents and Secoma's interrogatories indicated
42 rigs sold, the value of which was undetermined. ld. at 9 n.6. Thus, the two fIrms'
average annualized sales in the relevant market must have exceeded $3 million per year.
175. A rejected approach would have left all mergers too small to be reportable under
the Hart-Scott-Rodino program to the state enforcers. There is, however, no reason to
believe that such mergers are likely to have a special impact on only one state.
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States that are able and willing to challenge mergers will have
primary responsibility for:

A. Mergers that do not affect interstate commerce;
B. Mergers that primarily affect one state or a portion of a
state, such mergers being defined as those where at least
two-thirds of sales or purchases within the relevant
market(s) potentially affected by the merger are within a
single state;
C. A state is not foreclosed from challenging a portion of a
merger if most of the assets in question readily could be
segregated and held separate from the remainder of the
transaction. There is a rebuttable presumption that
retailing assets can be so segregated, and that nonretailing
assets cannot If the assets can be segregated and held
separate, the tests in part ll(B) will be applied to these
assets;
D. States will file in federal courts whenever possible, using
federal statutes or substantively identical state statutes
with better discovery or other procedural provisions. The
state attorneys general will oppose all attempts to enact
state antimerger laws inconsistent with the substantive
provisions of the Clayton Act. If states file under state
law they will stipulate that the statute is substantively
identical to the parallel federal antitrust law and that
federal precedents should control;

E. Notwithstanding the above, a transaction shall not be
considered to be within the area of primary state
responsibility if:
1. Aggregate worldwide sales of both companies exceed
$2.0 billion; and
2. The merging companies each have sales of at least
$250 million.
The suggested deftnition of nonnational mergers again parallels the
EEC determination. The two-thirds requirement, again borrowed from the
EEC approach, will mean that few mergers-only those that are truly the
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primary concern of one state-will be classified as within the primary
responsibility of a state. 176
Every existing state antimerger law is worded substantively identically
to the federal antimerger laws, althOU& it is unclear if each would be
interpreted identically by state judges. The requirement that the states
normally file in federal courts using federal statutes or substantively
identical state statutes is intended to increase certainty by making it more
likely that federal substantive precedent will be applied by federal judges.
The following provision is also reCommended:

m. A state or group of states will be less likely to challenge a
merger if the necessary relief would involve assets not located
primarily within the challenging state(s).
In all cases where the relief will occur substantially outside of
the challenging state(s), the challenging state(s) should
endeavor to consult and coordinate with state(s) where the
assets are located, as well as with the federal enforcers, in
advance of instituting a challenge and when planning any
necessary relief.
States are constitutionally permitted to challenge a merger even if
necessary relief would arise outside of the challenging state. 178
Nevertheless, a merger is less of a state's affair to the extent necessary
relief primarily must be effectuated in other states. If two flrms in state X,
who primarily sell in state Y, were to merge, the anticompetitive effects
would detrimentally affect state Y. If state Y was not allowed to challenge
such mergers, state X might be able to further the interests of its
corporations, who might be able to charge supra-competitive prices after
the merger at the expense of consumers in state Y.

176. Thus, if a merger of two chains of stores would lead to a readily segregable and
potentially anticompetitive overlap only in Pittsburgh, the federal enforcers nonnally would
defer that enforcement decision to officials within Pennsylvania unless the overall
transaction was so large that it had a national dimension. The Associated Dry Goods-May
Co. merger discussed supra note 164, would not fall within the area of primary state
responsibility since it exceeds the thresholds in section II(E). Nor would it be within the
area of presumptive federal authority, since it allegedly would have had effects in a discrete,
easily segregable market Rather, it would have fallen within the zone of shared federal/state
responsibility.
177. See M. Pfunder, supra note 12, at 13-14.
178. "Now no one doubts that state courts can reach persons located outside the forum
state, or that state legislatures have the authority to condemn certain acts that take place
outside the state." Hovenkamp, supra note 27, at 376; see also id. at 395,399 (discussing
extraterritorial application of state antitrust law).
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C. Areas of Shared FederaVState Responsibility
Lastly, the following provision should be added to the Federalism
Guidelines to apply to other kinds of mergers:
IV. Both the federal and state enforcers may challenge other
mergers. For these mergers the federal enforcers are to be the
primary enforcers. The state and federal enforcers will
coordinate responsibility for these mergers through a
clearance mechanism.
The state and federal enforcers should establish a formal joint
clearance mechanism analogous to the current FfC-DOJ merger liaison and
clearance procedure, to ensure that enforcement actions will be brought by
the most appropriate enforcer. 179 One problem that would arise, however,
stems from the federal enforcers' inability to release Hart-Scott-Rodino
material to the state enforcers, or even to confirm the existence of a
premerger filing. l80 The only way an effective clearance mechanism
could be established would be if an interested state had the burden of
going to the federal enforcers and telling them that the state had learned
of the existence of a specific merger and that the state wanted clearance to
challenge it. The federal enforcers would then have three options. First,
they could agree to let the state challenge the merger. Second, they could
agree that the merger should be challenged, but assert that they were best
suited to bring the case. Third, they could attempt to convince the state not
to challenge. As a practical matter, they often would be unable to convince
the states not to sue without revealing confidential information, for which
they would have to secure the merging parties' permission.
If the state and fedefcll enforcers were able to come to an agreement,
federal/state duplication, misunderstandings, and animosity could be
avoided and the enforcers' desires for appropriate relief could be
coordinated. The enforcers would be able to let the merging firms know
which enforcers would, and would not, be closely scrutinizing the
transaction. If no agreement were reached, either the federal or state
enforcers-or both-would be free to initiate a challenge; the situation as it
stands today.

179. One consideration would be the industry specific expertise of the different
enforcers.
180. See Liebennan v. FrC, 771 F.2d 32, 37 (2d Cir. 1985); Mattox v. FrC, 752 F.2d
116, 121 (5th Cir. 1985).

1090

NEW YORK LA.W SCHOOL LA.W REVIEW

[Vol. 3S

IV. CONCLUSIONS

Many state antitrust enforcers now consider merger enforcement a
significantly higher priority than they did a decade ago. Their
determination recently has been reinforced by a noteworthy Supreme Court
victory,l8l and it is unlikely that they will return to inactivity despite the
recent increase in federal enforcement. l82 There now exists, however, a
spirit of mutual federal/state respect that contrasts sharply with the situation
that existed during parts of the Reagan administration. This might be the
optimal time to concretize the mutual deference and cooperative spirit
through the negotiation of Federalism Guidelines.
The primary purpose of any Federalism Guidelines would be more to
tell merging firms, as a practical matter, whether state or federal enforcers
might seriously scrutinize the transaction than it would be to restrain state
or federal activity. Nevertheless, any agreed-upon Guidelines would entail
some self-restraint. This agreed-upon division of responsibility would only
last so long as reasonable people continue to head the antitrust enforcement
agencies, they continue to act in good faith, and their enforcement
decisions are continued to be viewed by the other antitrust enforcers as
mainstream and nonpolitical. Since future federal/state friction could cause
the NAAG, the DOJ, or the FTC to withdraw from the Federalism
Guidelines, this document's very existence might help to give all parties
somewhat more of an incentive to continue to behave cooperatively and to
continue enforcement patterns in antitrust's mainstream.
The proposed recommendations might not go far enough in many
respects. They might not strike the correct balance of federal, state, and
business planning concerns. They are only intended to constitute a first

181. See California v. American Stores Co., 110 S. Ct. 18S3 (1990).

182. Three cases were filed by state enforcers in 1990:
1. Connecticut and Massachusetts brought a Clayton Act challenge to Wyco
New Haven, Inc.'s acquisition of an oil terminal owned by New Haven Tenninal, Inc.
A consent decree was entered. See Connecticut v. Wyco New Haven, Inc., 1990-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) , 64,024 (D. Conn. 1990); S8 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 1467, at 809 (May 24, 1990).
2. Alabama filed a suit charging that a buyer of a bakery subject to an FTC
consent order violated the consent order by closing the bakery. A stipUlation was
entered. See Alabama v. Mills Family Bakery of Alabama, Inc., No. CV90 PT-978-M
(N.D. Ala. filed June 21, 1990); S9 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1476, at
127 (June 28, 1990).
3. Maine filed a suit against Georgia-Pacific Corp. to block a takeover bid of
Great Northern Nekoosa Corp. Both corporations were integrated forest product
companies. A consent decree was entered. See Maine v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.,
No. CV90-8 (Kennebeck Co. Super. Ct. 1990); NAAG Antitrust & Commerce Rep.
17 (Feb./Mar. 1990).
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draft of a beginning to a complex analysis, discussion, and negotiation.
Their main purpose is to establish federalism principles in a way that both
federal and state enforcers, as well as the business community, would
regard as a step forward. If an approach similar to that advocated in this
article could be agreed upon, it should be considered only to be a modest
starting point. Perhaps after a few years of experience under the Federalism
Guidelines additional avenues of federal/state cooperation and deference
would emerge, and the particulars of the federal/state division of
responsibility could be modified appropriately.
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APPENDIX
SUGGESTED MERGER FEDERALISM GUIDELINES
I.

Areas of federal responsibility, in which states will virtually never
challenge mergers.
Mergers will be classified into the following categories on a marketby-market basis if most of the assets at issue readily can be segregated
and held separate from the remainder of the transaction. There is a
rebuttable presumption that retailing assets can be so segregated, and
that nonretailing assets cannot. If the assets potentially giving rise to
the anticompetitive concerns cannot readily be so segregated, the
merger will be classified and evaluated as a whole to determine
whether it is within the following categories:

A. Exceptionally large mergers with a national dimension, defmed as
mergers for which
1. Aggregate worldwide sales of both firms combined exceed
$2.0 billion; and
2. The merging companies each have worldwide sales of at least
$250 million; except that
3. A state is not foreclosed from challenging a portion of any
merger if the assets giving rise to the potentially
anticompetitive problems readily could be segregated and held
separate from the remainder of the transaction without causing
the overall transaction to be abandoned; and
4. A state may challenge any merger if more than two-thirds of
both firms' sales or purchases are within that state.
B. Mergers that do not disproportionately affect that state. A merger
will not be considered to disproportionately affect a state unless
1. At least 25% of the sales or purchases in the relevant market
in question are within that state; or
2. The sales or purchases within a state are more than five times
that state's proportionate share of the United States population
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(or the population of any region of the U.S. that constitutes a
relevant geographic market for the product market in
question); notwithstanding the above
3. The sales or purchases in the relevant market(s) being
challenged, of the merging firms combined, must exceed $5
million. If more than two-thirds of the purchases or sales at
issue are within the same state, however, that state may
challenge the merger even if it is below the $5 million
threshold; except that
4. A state is not foreclosed from challenging a portion of any
merger if the merger would be likely to cause harm to a
discrete market within that state and if most of the assets in
dispute could readily be segregated and held separate from the
remainder of the transaction. There is a rebuttable presumption
that retailing assets can be so segregated, and that nonretailing
assets cannot. If the assets can be segregated and held
separate, the tests in subparts B(l) through B(3) above will be
applied to these assets.

n.

Areas of prim!lf)' state responsibility.
Many states lack the resources to challenge mergers. Except for
mergers that do not affect interstate commerce, the federal enforcers
often must continue to play the primary enforcement role.
States that are able and willing to challenge mergers will have primary
responsibility for:

A. Mergers that do not affect interstate commerce;
B. Mergers that primarily affect one state or a portion of a state,
such mergers being defined as those where at least two-thirds of
sales or purchases within the relevant market(s) potentially
affected by the merger are within a single state;
C. A state is not foreclosed from challenging a portion of a merger
if most of the assets in question readily could be segregated and
held separate from the remainder of the transaction. There is a
rebuttable presumption that retailing assets can be so segregated,
and that nonretailing assets cannot. If the assets can be segregated
and held separate, the tests in part nCB) will be applied to these
assets;
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D. States will file in federal courts whenever possible, using federal
statutes or substantively identical· state statutes with better
discovery or other procedural provisions. The state attorneys
general will oppose all attempts to enact state antimerger laws
inconsistent with the substantive provisions of the Clayton Act. If
states file under state law they will stipulate that the statute is
substantively identical to the parallel federal antitrust law and that
federal precedents should control;

E. Notwi!h-standing the above, a transaction shall not be considered
to be within the area of primary state responsibility if:
1. Aggregate worldwide sales of both companies exceed $2.0
billion; and
2. The merging companies each have sales of at least $250
million.
ill. A state or group of states will be less likely to challenge a merger if
the necessary relief would involve assets not located primarily within
the challenging state(s).

In all cases where the relief will occur substantially outside of the
challenging state(s), the challenging state(s) should endeavor to consult
and coordinate with state(s) where the assets are located, as well as
with the federal enforcers, in advance of instituting a challenge and
when planning any necessary relief.
IV. Both the federal and state enforcers may challenge other mergers. For
these mergers the federal enforcers are to be the primary enforcers.
The state and federal enforcers will coordinate responsibility for these
mergers through a clearance mechanism.

